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1. Introduction 
The study on the management of emergency situations in the Member States and 
in the Community is located in the dimension of federalism and responsibility. 
The guiding hypothesis of the Member States safety regulations and the Rapid 
Exchange System can be set out as follows: The driving force for structural and 
institutional reform in the Community is the management of emergency 
situation. There is a strong interrelationship between the emergence of an 
emergency, its management within the existing legal and administrative 
structure, the lack of appropriate rules and structures to deal with emergencies, 
the reform of rules and structures to handle emergencies better, the emergence of 
the next emergency which entails again a revision of the instruments and the 
structure, and so forth. 
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Emergencies escape regulation. Regulation must fail because the circumstances 
of the emergency cannot be anticipated 1. A consequence which does not entail 
too far-reaching repercussions in Member States, which does, however create 
many more problems at Community level where the frame to further develop 
adequate structures and means is restricted by primary Community law and by 
the unwillingness of Member States to initiate a change. What Member States 
are doing in the adoption of the safety directive is to develop further in the 
restraint frame complex institutional structures which sum up Member States 
experience, which are, however, to a large extent not appropriate to tackle the 
problem of emergency management adequately. The Member States squeeze the 
management of emergency situations in a procrustean bed. The regulation is 
inadequate and short-sighted because it does not take care of the unforeseeable 
character of the emergency which requires much more flexible loosely knit 
structures than the Member States are willing to grant. lt would be wrong to 
conclude that the efforts of all those participating in the law-making at 
Community level are useless or even worthless. They document a remarkable 
progress in the reform of administrative structure in a constitution which is in 
flux and they may be apt to deal with all kinds of non-emergency situations. 
They remain nevertheless insufficient. 
The "clou" of product safety regulation, however, is that it develops its own 
structures, if the emergency occurs. And exactly these new adhoc structures 
indicate the direction in which the institutional reform of the Community further 
drives - towards much more flexibility and openness, to a looser frame than 
that provided for by the product safety directive and to a looser frame than that 
provided for by the Treaty. The legal prob lern is that the management of 
emergency situations then occurs largely outside the finely tuned institutional 
balance between the Member States and the Community organs. lt will rest upon 
the European Court of Justice to bring practice outside the strict legal 
institutional frame and the necessity of adequate management of emergency 
situations together. The result will be another element of the Community legal 
order, again done by the Court. 
In order to verify the hypothesis we will first look at the "should be structures" in 
the Member States and in the Community which have been established to deal 
with emergencies2. The analysis here is based on the graphs and flow charts 
which have been developed for the five selected Member States and the 
Commission3. The main findings clash together with all that we could learn from 
1 In more detail, cf. infra, III, 58 et seq. 
2 II. is dedicated to that question, 39 et seq. 
3 They may be found as an annex to respective reports of the Member States and of the management of 
emergency situations. 
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the case-studies4 and the interviews taken with the experts at all levels5. The 
comparison of the "should be structures" with the "as it is in practice" will 
hammer out the deficiencies of the administrative structure and the role of 
emergency situations as a guiding principle in shaping responsibilities in an 
emerging federalist European Order6. 
The leading theoretical category, which characterizes "federalism in process", is 
"emergency". 
Emergencies can be seen as one end of the dimension 'Safety, Risk, Danger, 
Damage and Emergency. These 5 categories have in common that they are to 
a !arge extent contingent upon social interpretation. Nevertheless a rough 
sketch is possible: 'Safety' presents a holistic-positive reference to unwanted 
effects of Iife and biography. In every day life the strive for safety appears to 
be delusive, because objective and subjective safety are not the same at all, 
rather one variant can perfectly exist without the other. Objective safety is a 
phenomenon of a sufficiently ex post cognition, it is, however, hardly more 
than the objective to avoid dangers and damages or keep them restricted. The 
term 'risk' includes on a theoretical Ievel the power of imagination, 
competence of explanation and the desire of investigation, available to a 
society which intends anticipativly to fend off dangers and to secure a relative 
safety for the future. Engagement in risk brings into operation the intellectual 
segments of societal experience and evaluating knowledge which are 
concentrated on the prevention of might-be calamities. Split from that and 
semantically to be distinguished, '<langer' becomes apparent in the very 
moment of its realisation in the real-time. There is no risk anymore, the 
theoretical dimension, the projection, evaporated in favour of an imminent 
threat of a disaster, if no action is taken. Danger compels appropriate action 
according to the factual and dynamic situation, otherwise a damage will occur. 
'Damage' Ieaves the affected person or the public startled. There is no chance 
for immediate action anymore. What seemed to be avoidable up to that very 
moment had happened despite of risk-assessment and protective measures 
against <langer. The occurring of damage throws a bad light upon all efforts to 
prevent it and puts responsibility in its true light: damages do not seem to be 
preventable at all. Once bitten twice shy. Damage is the reverse-image of risk-
control. What in retrospection is explainable as a disastrous consequence of 
ill-structured decisions becomes the ground of a prospective risk-management 
calculating in a new round an enlightened chain of cause and effect. The term 
'emergency' carries along lots of elements of the other four. lt may be regarded 
as the worst possible compound. Ingredients are: Danger wasn't perceived. A 
damage can be observed, no matter how many suffer from it. That means 
safety in at least one case is lost. The damage might Iead to further damages 
4 They have been undertaken as part of the research project in the fi ve selected Member States. 
5 The interviews taken at the Member States and at the Community level with the risk managers have 
been analysed in Part !, Chapter 3, 87 et seq. 
6 Cf. infra, IV, 81. 
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similar to a chain-reaction. Whether a damage is an indicator for an 
emergency in the field of product-safety, firstly depends on the instruments a 
society provides to detect it. These instruments might be bodies of 
surveillance, systems of notification an information and staffs of experts. 
These instruments, however, do not function by themselves.7 lt needs 
competent personnel who is able to solve a crucial problem. That means, 
because of the lack of definitive criteria what an emergency might be - that 
is because an event that cannot be expected cannot be defined and regulated in 
advance - these criteria have to be developed in no time. In a first step 
research and evaluation of facts have to be undertaken. But nearly 
simultaneously measures of hazard-prevention must be found. Only these two 
operations are differing circles of action. One is bound to a logic of 
reconstructing the connex between the technical design of a product and its 
faulty consequences in every-day-use and the other one puts the immediate 
pressure on constructive solutions. These two circles are connected to a 
difficile interrelation. Regarding an emergency it has to be found out, whether 
a causal damage will indeed lead to consequences going far beyond the initial 
trouble. Of much more importance is the reach of consequences which has to 
be estimated, mainly if they could run out of control. All the routines of risk-
assessment have to be undertaken by the emergency managers under the 
condition of real life without intellectual hoop-jumping in an extremely short 
time span, as there are: what might be the subsequent dangers, how is the cost-
benefit-relation shaped, might the dangers be tolerable, all these criteria have 
to be reproduced under the conditions of real-time and real damage and the 
threat of forthcoming catastrophies. 
Emergencies are challenging structures and produce new structures outside the 
European legal system. The institutional constraints, imposed by the Law of the 
European Community foster what the Member States constantly blame: over-
bureaucratization and over-politization of decision-making procedures, where 
more flexibility and a substantial input of semi-professionalized8 expertise is 
required. The "emergency" escapes these regulatory institutional constraints. lt 
provides lee-way for the development and insertion of expertise. The new 
structures largely built outside existing law and even somewhat outside legal 
control, can produce socially accepted results only if it is ensured that the fora of 
experts do not favour particular interests. Social imbalance may only be avoided 
if the consumer in general as subject of European law is regarded as the centre of 
all efforts to regain safety. 
7 In Germany for instance the case-study on the "exploding" office chairs revealed that hundreds of 
minor accidents caused by the breaking gas-cylinder had been notified. Not before the severe accident 
in Hannover events were seen as an emergency. 
8 Cf. the notion of semi-professionalized is explained in Th. Roethe, Strukturprinzipien profes-
sionalisierten anwaltlichen Handelns. Eine hermeneutische Rekonstruktion anwaltlicher Schei-
dungsberatungen, Baden-Baden 1994. 
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The Member States invoke the subsidiarity principle9 and the "illegal intrusion" 
of Community law in the national legal system 10 to maintain their autonomy and 
to strive the Community legal order behind supremacy, direct effect and pre-
emption 11 . This is especially true for the Federal Republic of Germany which 
has challenged Art. 9 of the directive being at the heart of the management of 
emergencies12. Once and again the Court of Justice is prompted into a key role 
in order to decide under the overall heading of "competence rules" in the 
nowhere land of admissible interpretation and inadmissible policy making 13 on 
the future European Integration. The Court of Justice is given priority in legal 
analysis and voices have been raised from different sides advocating judicial 
restraint, in order to stabilize the legal order rather than to promote further 
development 14. Does - to frame it in the words of J.H.H. Weiler - Member 
States' intergovernmentalism prevail over European supranationalism? Or will it 
remain on the Court of Justice to tie the whole "construct" together and to push 
for an institutional reform of the EEC which has so blatantly been neglected in 
and around the Maastricht negotiations? The interplay between inter-
governmentalism and supranationalism may serve as a duster in the search for a 
response. 
II. Typology of should be structures in product safety regulation 
Administrative structures of product safety regulation in the Member States 
cannot be separated from the constitutional pattern of the Member States 15. 
9 Cf. J. Pipkorn, Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Vertrag über die Europäische Union - rechtliche 
Bedeutung und gerichtliche Überprüfbarkeit, EuZW 1992, 697 et seq.; N. Emiliou, Subsidiarity. An 
effective Barrier Against "the Enterprise of Ambition", ELRev 1992, 385 et seq. 
10 Cf. E. Steindorff, Quo vadis Europa? Freiheiten, Regulierung und soziale Rechte nach den erweiterten 
Zielen der EG-Verfassung, in: Forschungsinstitut für Wirtschaftsverfassung und Wettbewerb, e.V. 
(ed.) Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften und der Marktwirtschaft, Köln-Berlin-
Bonn-München, Heft 148, 1992, 11 et seq. The point at stake is the erosion of the principle of 
enumerated powers. 
11 As the still constituting principles of the Community legal order, cf. E. Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the 
Making of an International Constitution, AJIL 1980, 1 et seq. 
12 Cf. Case C-359/92, OJ C 288, 5.11.1992, 10 et seq. 
13 Cf. Ch. Joerges, European Economic Law, the Nation State and the Maastricht Treaty, in R. Dehousse 
(ed) The European Union Treaty, München 1993; St.Weatherill, Regulating the Interna! Market: 
Result orientation in the House of Lords (1992) 17, ELRev 299 et seq. 
14 Cf. G. Brüggemeier/Ch. Joerges, Europäisierung des Vertrags- und Haftungsrechts, in P.-Ch. Müller-
Graff (ed.) Gemeinsames Privatrecht in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 1993, 233 et seq. 
15 Cf. chart on the constitutional structure of the five Member States in question, which is based on the 
graphs on the surveys of the institutional structures of the different Member States, 42. 
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The Federal Republic of Germany alone is a fully developed federation. 
Federalist elements are found in Spain, although the FRG and Spain cannot be 
put on an equal footing 16. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Portugal 
are far away from a federalist structure. The constitutional differences are 
reflected at the administrative level. Fully fledged federations usually have three 
administrative levels: national, regional and local. Competences between the 
national and the regional level are shared by and in the constitution. Conflicts 
between the two levels are part of the federalist system. Autonomy of the regions 
always stands against national power. The local authorities are dependant on the 
regional level. They have to assist the regional centres in law enforcement. 
Non-federalist nations do not know an intermediary regional level equipped with 
constitutional competence. If a regional level exists, it is established for 
improving coordination between the national and the local level. Regional 
administration, if it exists, may even have powers, but these powers would 
derive from the national power, they are not genuine in the sense that they are 
constitutionally guarantied. Usually, local authorities have a greater role to play 
than in federalist nations. This is clear from the constitutional mandate, but it 
facilitates pragmatic solutions in the risk management. Local authorities are 
perhaps not the only one, but certainly the first one to act, if an emergency 
occurs. The national level is far away from the real problem. Coordination takes 
time, even if a regional organisation coordinates the flow of information. 
For a deeper analysis of the administrative structure it is necessary to go beyond 
the rough constitutional distinction between federalist and non-federalist 
countries. The challenge for defining typologies is to find catch-words, which 
characterize the national structure without being superficial whilst avoiding the 
<langer that elements which do not fit into the typology are set aside. Being 
aware of the <langer we would like to distinguish three types of administration, 
which have a lot to do with the reasons and the background of the constitutional 
decision on institutional responsibilities: (1) Rule guided administrations, (2) 
pragmatic and (3) "democratic" administrations. This distinction needs 
explanation and even the meaning of each needs explanation. lt will be done by 
following the four types of graphs on the way in which levels of hierarchy 
(power to instruct), the exchange of information, the duty of consultation and the 
powers to take action are organised17. The institutional analysis 18 provides the 
background for the way in which the different administrations handle i.e. should 
16 Spain, however, has become a subject of interest for research undertaken in Germany, A. L6pez-Pina, 
Der gerichtliche Grundrechtsschutz in Spanien, KritV 1990, 34 et seq. 
17 For a general introduction to the better understanding and reading of the graphs, cf. Chapter 1, 
Federalism and Responsibility, 6. 
18 This is the purpose of the flow charts on the "Survey of the institutional structures", cf. Chapter 1, 
Federalism and Responsibility, 6. 
43 
H. - W. Micklitz ! Th. Roethe 
handle, from their very starting point, an emergency situation. Ideally each 
typological pattern should, if the hypothesis is correct, determine risk 
management. Flow charts elaborated for each Member State seen and reviewed 
in a comparative analysis will facilitate the understanding and give a deeper 
insight of how institutional pattems guide the management of emergency 
situations which form the core of the analysis19. 
The inter-national comparison of institutional structures already makes clear how 
difficult it is to develop an institutional frame for the management of emergency 
situations at Community level. Law-making at the community level by way of 
adopting directives or guide-lines follows the maximisation principle20. The 
system now established in the product safety directive reflects the three 
structural types of the five Member States. The mechanism in Art. 8 et seq. of 
the directive is rule-guided, pragmatic and democratic. lt bears elements of each 
type which can be traced back to the respective national traditions. lt is 
fascinating to see how the Cornmunity develops progressively, by yielding new 
supra-national structures, so far unknown in the Community. Again, it is not 
submitted that these administrative structures are adequate in fighting emergency 
situations, but it is striking to see that the product safety regulation prepares the 
institutional ground for a European risk management, which, if it occurs, will 
probably break the rules and push the development of the institutional 
infrastructure one step further. 
lt is the practical management of emergency situations which functions as a 
vehicle for the elaboration of a constitutional frame21. Meanwhile, questions and 
answers arising in relation to product safety spillover into other fields of 
Community development. And vice versa - institutional and constitutional 
questions tackled elsewhere come to influence the evolution of product safety 
policy. No single area of Community activity can exist in isolation. lt is true, the 
federal issues confronted by the Community are made much more difficult 
because of the absence of a single federal pattern in the Member States. 
Therefore examining national systems and their differences automatically offers 
new perspectives on the prospects for Community federalism. 
19 The flow charts are to be found in the respective annexes to the Member States' and to the 
Commission's reports, cf. !ist of graphs, VII et seq. 
20 Already A. Bleckmann, Zu den Auslegungsmethoden des Europäischen Gerichtshofs, NJW 1982, 
1177 et seq. 
21 For a deeper analysis of the importance of emergency situations for the institutional and social 
development, cf. infra, 60 et seq. 
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1. Rule-guided administrations - the example of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 
Rule-guided administrations cover those countries whose structure, whose 
competences, and whose daily practice is determined by the availability of rules 
in form of constitutional norms, laws, regulations, and even inner-administrative 
guide-lines (Verwaltungsvorschriften). Rule-guided does not necessarily mean 
"verrechtlicht" - judicialized. Rule-guided puts emphasis on the structural 
relevance of rules for the "risk-managers"22. Rule guided would mean that in 
case of emergency the risk manager is not individually but structurally bound to 
raise the question: Are there rules against which the risk can be measured?23 
Though the Federal Republic of Germany lies in the centre of the analysis, one 
might easily attribute the typology of rule-guided to French and American 
administrations24. Such a side-step illustrates that rule-guided administrations 
are not only found in federations. The French risk management is to a large 
extent rule guided25 , although France is not a federation and will not become 
one, not even after its shift towards regionalism26. The effects of rule guided 
structures in France are different though. As regions are still not autonomous in 
what they are doing the risk managers are structurally expected to ask in case of 
an emergency "what will Paris say?", before they take any action. In France rule 
guided management is connected to the very hierarchical structure of the French 
administration27. 
lt is characteristic of the German administrative structure that there is a clear 
borderline between the national and the regional (Länder) level. The Länder 
have to enforce the federal law. That is why one may speak of "Vollzugs-
Föderalismus", enforcement federalism28. The Länder are not dependant on 
22 There is no need to discuss the phenomenon of judicialisation (Verrechtlichung) here. 
23 The individual behaviour of the risk-managers is not at stake here. lt is one striking phenomenon that 
the risk managers in case of emergency forget about their rules, cf. infra Part I, Chapter 1, 87 et seq. 
24 We would like to refer to our study on post-market control of consumer goods, where we investigated 
the recall mechanisms of inter alia France and the United States, cf. H.-W.Micklitz (ed.) Post Market 
Control of Consumer Goods, ZERP Schriftenreihe Band 11, Baden-Baden 1990. 
25 Perhaps with the exception of the Commission pour Ja securite des consommateurs, cf. H.-
W.Micklitz, in: Ch. Joerges et al., loc.cit., Produktsicherheitsrecht in Frankreich, 61 et seq. 
26 Cf. H. Siedentopf/J. Ziller (eds.) Making European Policies Work - The Implementation of 
Community Legislation in the Member States 1988, Brylant (II Volumes). 
27 Although the administrative structure as such has considerably changed since its reform in the early 
eighties, cf. H. Siedentopf/J. Ziller, loc. cit.: Tue regulation of product safety remains somewhat apart 
as the example of the "Commission pour Ja Securite des Consommateurs" shows. 
28 Cf. J.Abr. Frowein, Integration and the Federal Experience in Germany and Switzerland, in: M. 
Cappelletti/M.Seccombe/J.H.H.Weiler (eds.) Integration through Law, Berlin 1986, 586 et seq. and 
H.-W.Micklitz, Organisational Structures of Product Safety Regulation, in: B.Stauder (ed.) La securite 
des produits de Ja consommation, Integration europeene et consommateur suisse, Actes du colloque 
organise avec Je centre d'etude juridiques europeennes, Faculte de Droit de Geneve, Fevrier 1992, 49 
et seq. 
45 
H. - W. Micklitz /Th. Roethe 
national instructions and they are not even obliged to take care of what the other 
German Länder are doing in law enforcement29. The strong constitutional 
position of the Länder is grounded already in the foundation of the Norddeutsche 
Bund in 185030. 
The Länder authorities have the power to instruct the local authorities. 
Interference from outside the respective Land whether horizontally or vertically 
is not possible. lt is a downward instruction chain which begins at the Länder 
level31 . Information exchange and consultation beyond the internal Länder 
structure is not possible without regulatory intervention to restrict the autonomy 
of the Länder. Information and consultation duties mean a decline of power and 
autonomy. And the Länder are quite reluctant to give up their constitutionally 
guarantied position. That is why it is so difficult to build up in Germany a 
network of mutual information exchange and consultation in both directions, 
horizontally and vertically. Any legislation needs the explicit consent of the 
Länder in the German Bundesrat, otherwise it is not possible to impose binding 
obligations on the competent authorities. The present system is a mixture of 
relatively imprecise obligations combined with an informal network, erected and 
managed by the Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz or as in the field of foodstuff, a 
set of non-binding rules which defines the cooperation to regulate emergencies at 
all levels32. The strong regional autonomy culminates in the monopoly of the 
Länder authorities to make decisions. However, in case of an emergency, the 
strong position of the Länder can be turned down as the federal minister disposes 
of a genuine competence to warn the public which is derived from its 
constitutional mandate to protect the citizens against risks. The third statutory 
function - safety not security33 - challenges the federalist principle on which 
the decision monopoly is built. 
29 Within the constraints of mutual cooperation duties, cf. generally, J. Falke, in: Ch.Joerges et al„ Joc„ 
cit., 132 et seq. 
30 For the relationship between the economic and the legal-constitutional development of Germany, cf. 
G. Brüggemeier, Die Entwicklung des Rechts im organisierten Kapitalismus, Band 1, 1977. 
31 Cf. charts on the power to direct, cf. German report Part II, Chapter 6, 244 et seq. 
32 The so-called Allgemeine Leitsätze, cf. German report, Part II, Chapter 6, 261 et seq. 
33 Cf. H.-W.Micklitz, Consumer Rights, in: A.Cassese/A.Clapham/J.H.Weiler (eds.) Human Rights and 
the European Community: The Substantive Law, European Union - The Human Right Challenge, 
Florence 1991, 53 et seq. 
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2. The dominance of pragmatism in the administrative structure - a lesson 
from the UK and the Netherlands 
Where the link between the national and the local level is not subject to the 
constitutional architecture, pragmatic solutions are easier to install. Whatever the 
structure might be it is shaped according to the needs of the issue involved. If it 
is regulating product safety, it is done in a way so as to make efficient solutions 
possible and feasible. Though and again, as in countries with a federalist 
structure, the lee-way for functional and pragmatic administrative structures 
cannot be understood without the very specific constitutional background that is 
to say the development of a democracy of the Netherlands and the UK34. 
The striking characteristic of the United Kingdom consists in the degree to 
which national bureaucracies are free from governmental political influence. 
This is especially true for the Health and Safety Commission which is 
responsible for the regulation of the products used at work35. lt is less developed, 
though still existing, in the field of product and food safety. One might link the 
autonomy and independence of these institutions to the well-settled democratic 
foundation of the British society. There seems to be no fear that these national 
institutions are abusing their powers36. Such a basis allows much discretion in 
the concrete shaping of the administrative structures. 
The Netherlands send another message. Here parallel structures of control have 
been established. They may be called parallel, because there are on the one hand 
the public officials of the Department of W elfare, Health and Cultural Affairs 
who have the competence to intervene at the local level, and there are on the 
other hand the regional inspectors of the Food and Commodities Inspection 
Department, the Management of the Food and Veterinary Affairs and Product 
Safety who control likewise the product and foodstuff safety at the local level. 
The probable duplication of administrative structures might have something to 
do with a Dutch phenomenon which seems to be unique even in the European 
Community. The enforcement of foodstuff and product safety regulation lies in 
34 There is no need, to discuss the existence of a constitution in the UK. lt suffices to refer to the 
development of a democracy in the UK. 
35 Cf. the UK report, Part II, Chapter 10, 463 et seq. 
36 The parallel to the American agencies is striking, though different to explain. The United States do 
not know social rights of the third generation which are constitutionally guarantied. The national 
government accepts the responsibility for the health and safety of the American citizens. but it is not a 
constitutional responsibility. Might be that there is a linkage between the strong status of the 
American agencies, like the Consumer Product Safety Commission (strong in relation to parallel 
European institutions, but weak in comparison to the Food and Drug Agency or the Environmental 
Protection Agency), cf. G.Majone, Cross-Cultural Sources of Regulatory Policy Making in Europe 
andin the United States, Journal of Public Policy 1991, 79 et seq. 
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the hands of the same authorities. There is no inner-national sharing of 
competences between different national branches of the government37. 
Information exchange and consultation procedures correspond to the flexible 
structures in the UK and the Netherlands. For the UK information exchange 
cannot become a question of power, autonomy or even sovereignty of the 
authority in charge. Information exchange can entirely be bound to efficiency. 
Lacots and Hazprod document the leading position of information exchange 
systems which remain unaffected by constitutional or status problems. The same 
can be said for the organisation of the consultation procedure. Who is to be 
consulted at what stage is decided under pragmatic considerations. Regulating 
food safety needs consultation and advice from competent local authorities. lt is 
here where the competence is settled. Quite the contrary is true for the regulation 
of consumer goods. A strong link between the local authorities and the 
consultation and advice from the national Consumer Policy Unit brings to bear a 
centralised risk assessment. The parallel structures in the Netherlands heavily 
influence the information exchange and the consultation procedure. The mutual 
need between the different branches of the government to exchange information 
and to seek advice and to require consultation leads necessarily to relatively 
complex structures38. 
lt goes without saying that the decision-making level in countries like the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom remains in the hands of central national 
authorities. They have to take the decisions as they bear the final responsibility 
for the consequences of statutory intervention. Recent years document a trend, 
however, which runs counter to the German development. Whereas emergency 
management in the Federal Republic of Germany has shown the need to 
centralise decision-making at least in exceptional cases, the UK and the 
Netherlands have strengthened the powers of the local authorities39. This is 
particularly true for the trading standard officers, who have been given 
regulatory powers under the 1987 amendment of the Consumer Product Safety 
Act, but it is likewise true for the Netherlands where the regional competences 
have been reorganised and strengthened. One may conclude "safety" as a state 
function yields a diversification of the action-taking authorities. lt is no longer 
possible to concentrate the decision making power either in the hands of the 
national or the regional authorities, powers are needed where the problems come 
up, quite independent of where the risk first appears, at the national, the regional 
37 Dutch product safety regulation has emerged from food regulation. Products were integrated in the 
regulatory framework of the very same Warenwet, cf. the Dutch report, Part II, Chapter 7, 326 et seq. 
38 Cf. the charts on information exchange and consultation from the Netherlands, Part II, Chapter 7, 344 
et seq. 
39 For a closer analysis of the effects of EEC law on the inner-administrative structure of the Member 
States, cf. infra II. 5„ 53 et seq. 
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or the local level. This insight should immediately trigger an awareness of the 
problem that will inevitably be encountered when a Community level comes to 
be added. Institutional and constitutional problems will be deepened. 
3. Democratic-induced administrative structures - the Spanish and 
Portuguese contribution 
All administrative structures in the Member States of the European Community 
are democratic in the sense that the States are all democracies. Why then call the 
administrative structures of Spain and Portugal "democratic"? The reason is this: 
In Spain and Portugal consumer protection is part of a social movement which 
ought to help stabilizing the young democracies. These countries alone have 
integrated consumer protection in their constitutions, and these countries alone 
have concretised the constitutional mandate in comprehensive and far-reaching 
consumer protection legislation, in between others - regulation and protection 
of health and safety40. The evolving consumer protection is inevitably linked to 
the process of democratisation, a finding which does not hold true for any other 
Member State of the Community, perhaps with the exception of Greece. 
Democratic-induced consumer protection has guided the establishment of the 
necessary administrations to enforce the new laws, thereby putting the risk 
managers into a position where they must look for allies if they want to take 
action. Decision-making is structurally bound to the societal support in these 
countries41 . 
If one takes a look at the flow charts in order to discover who has the power to 
give instructions to whom, one might first of all be surprised by the very 
complex and detailed network between the different levels and the different 
authorities. lt seems to be as if the national governments in Spain and Portugal 
intend to keep the enforcement of product safety regulation under control. This 
first impression is somewhat counterbalanced by the constitutional position of 
the Spanish autonomous regions which is similar to that of the German Länder. 
The autonomous regions bear original and constitutional competences to regulate 
product safety42 and to execute the national and regional laws. But, and this is 
true even for Spain, the rules adopted to realise product and food safety provide 
40 Cf. H.-W.Micklitz, Consumer Rights. loc.cit. 
41 In so far, Spain and Portugal are relatively near to third world countries like Brazil, Uruguay or 
Malaysia, where consumer protection is not an isolated field of more or less well-established 
organisations, consumer protection is part of movement to push for or to strengthen the yet not stable 
democracies. 
42 The shared competences in the law-making is not without conflicts, cf. the Spanish report, Part II, 
Chapter 9, 402 et seq. 
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the national government with the ultimate power to instruct the subordinated or 
even the concurrent institutions. The government has to ensure, if it becomes 
necessary, that it has the power to instruct the regions what to do. Holding 
central powers in reserve is a mere Spanish characteristic and might be explained 
by the overall fear that the young democracies need guidance in case of 
competence conflicts. The over-organisation of instruction powers shows 
remnants of fascism43. 
The complex organisation of the administrative structure with its interwoven 
powers of who is enabled to instruct whom requires a complementary finely 
tuned network to organize information exchange between the different levels and 
the different authorities and a comprehensive testing machinery which allows a 
high degree of substantative rationality, again in order to document the "physical 
presence" of the democracy. Likewise complementary to the anticipatory set of 
instruction powers operates the shaping of the consultation procedure. Here, at 
least in Spain, the consultation procedure brings up the problem whether and to 
what degree the regions are really and may or shall remain autonomous. They 
defend their autonomous rights and try to reject consultation duties imposed on 
them44. 
Action taking competences in Portugal remain in the hands of the national 
government and the national authorities. Portugal has adopted product safety 
legislation which was inspired by the French approach providing for a Consumer 
Product Safety Commission with limited though relevant competences to inform 
the public on possible dangerous products45. In Spain the competences between 
the national authorities and the autonomous regions are shared. Contrary to the 
German solution, however, the respective rules provide in case of emergencies 
for the opportunity to build up cooperative joint decision-making structures, joint 
because the national and the authorities participate in the procedure. Laying 
responsibilities in the two hands, the national government and the regions, seems 
to be quite a promising model even for the organisation of the future decision-
making procedure in the European Community46. lt might even be a solution to 
avoid constitutional debates on sovereignty and autonomy. 
43 The extreme formality of the rules and the fiction that everything can be and should be regulated. 
44 This lesson can easily be drawn from a number of law-suits between the national government and the 
autonomous regions, cf. the Spanish report, Part II, Chapter 9, 404 et seq. 
45 Cf. H.-W.Micklitz, in: Ch.Joerges et al., loc.cit. 
46 For details, cf. infra, II.5., 51 et seq. 
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The purpose of the flow charts is to focus on the way in which these different 
types of administrative structures are - in theory - prepared for the 
management of an emergency situation. This is, at one level, very detailed 
information applicable only to product safety. Yet, precisely because of the 
detailed differences shown to exist between the Member States, the graphs 
present some very wide-ranging questions about the prospects of 
Europeanisation of law and practice. 
Flow charts have been prepared for each country according to the type of 
product concerned, consumer goods or foodstuff47. They follow the same pattern 
whilst dividing the flow of information, consultation and decision-making into 
more or less four sectors: Notification, processing, evaluation and decision, 
warning the public at large. Notification refers to the way in which the 
competent authorities obtain knowledge of a possible risk; processing means the 
organisational, the informational and the consultative preparations; evaluation 
and decision aim at the question, whether there is a risk, which must be defined 
as an emergency that requires statutory action; warning the public concerns the 
quality of the statutory intervention, where the information of the public is the 
last resort to which the responsible authorities refer only if all other efforts to 
handle the problem have failed. 
The notification systems though they are differing in detail, have one thing in 
common: they centre on information input from statutory agencies, authorities, 
officials. Emphasis must be put on "statutory" notifications from private actors, 
whether from the consumers or the producers which are not structurally 
integrated in the notification system. For Spain and Portugal, the state-orientated 
notification systems are easily explained by the overall assumption that a strong 
and authoritative state must protect the citizens against criminal near violations 
of product and food safety law. Such an interpretation is not apt to explain the 
similar British and German nucleus. Here one must seek the explanation quite 
contrary to the Spanish and the Portuguese reliance on a strong state in the 
responsibility attributed to the market mechanism. There is no need to impose 
notification duties on the producers and the suppliers, if the market mechanism 
works efficiently48 . If at all, the Netherlands alone integrale the manufacturers 
into the notification system. The reason here seems to lie in the size of the 
country which allows under the assumption of a similar or identical degree of 
47 They are to found in the respective annexes to the national reports, cf. !ist of graphs, VII. 
48 On the possibilities and restraints to influence the market mechanism by way of information, 
Ch.Joerges, in: Ch. Joerges et al„ loc.cit„ 51 et seq. 
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industrialisation a better networking between the statutory authorities and private 
industry /cornrnerce. 
Processing is to a large extent guided by the different product categories. The 
British and the German systems on processing risks of dangerous consumer 
goods are rooted in the much older establishment of appropriate control systems 
for products used at work49. Expert knowledge is the dominating factor. There is 
no structural anticipation to integrate external knowledge from other levels and 
other decision-makers into the processing itself. lt resembles a closed system 
where access is limited to those who belong to the guild of experts50. 
Processing in the field of foodstuff cannot be organised in the very same way. 
Risk managers and decision-makers have to be brought together here. Processing 
is structurally not possible without combining the different levels of 
competences. Complicated and complex information exchange mechanisms and 
consultation procedures bear witness to that necessity. This is true for the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands and Portugal where there is an ongoing search for the 
setting-up of feasible links between experts and decision-makers. In Spain and 
Germany "processing" challenges the federalist structure. The Spanish 
cooperative approach is an attempt to balance out the constitutional conf!ict 
between the national government and the autonomous regions. lt might well be 
that the opportunity to set into being the "extraordinary organ" protects Spain 
against a permanent constitutional conflict on the sharing of responsibilities51 . 
The same difference between consumer goods and foodstuffs comes to bear in 
the evaluation of the risk and the deterrnination of the decisions. There is a 
structural preponderance of experts, the risk managers, in the evaluation of - and 
the decision making about consumer goods. Quite the contrary is true for 
foodstuff. Here the preponderance lies with the political decision-makers. There 
is a structural divergence between consumer goods and foodstuffs which will 
attract our attention at a later stage52. Testing foodstuffs and the test results are 
in themselves meaningless, at least to a large extent. They gain societal 
importance only if the political decision-makers interpret them as a source of 
action53 . 
W arning the public remains the ultimate means always in the hands of the 
national governments. There is a correlation between the intensity of statutory 
intervention and the degree to which decision-making is centralised. This 
49 Cf. Beyond the national reports, the research undertaken by the National Institute of Advanced Legal 
Studies under the direction of R. Baldwin & T. Daintith (eds.) Harmonisation and Hazard : Regulating 
Workplace Health and Safety in the European Community, London 1992. 
50 F. Wagner, Der öffentliche Dienst im Staat der Gegenwart, in VVDStRL 37 (1979), 214 et seq. 238 
names them as so called "Fachbrüderschaften". 
S 1 Cf. the Spanish report, Part II, Chapter 9, 402 et seq. 
52 Cf. infra, III, 60 et seq. 
53 This is explained in detail, cf. infra III, 58 et seq. 
52 
Process 
phenomenon is to be reported from all Member States whatever their 
constitutional requirements are. lt does not mean that decision-making is always 
done at the central level. The elaboration of product safety legislation has led to 
a diversification of responsibilities in decision-making, apart from warning the 
public. For the sake of honesty it should be recalled, however, that in Spain even 
local authorities are empowered to warn the public. This peculiarity goes back to 
the Colza-scandal and must be seen as a strong connection to the intention of the 
legislator that decision making should remain close to the citizen in order to 
grant social groups some form of constitutional status54. The delegation of the 
power to warn the public, from the national level to the municipalities, binds the 
latter to the objectives of the Spanish democracy. 
Criminal sanction structures are on the decline. They are not compatible with a 
market society. Criminal sanctions are tobe replaced by civil sanctions. Warning 
the public as the last resort means a shift, not only in safety policy where 
information on risks has become the cornerstone for the availability of regulatory 
mechanism, but also a shift from an "adrninistered" market to "free" market55 . 
5. The structural response of the EEC - a mirror image of the Member States 
in maximising their substantial elements 
The structural response at stake here is to a large extent determined by the 
Community legal order. The Treaty of Rome does not allow the establishment of 
direct links between the Commission and the regional and local level of the 
Member States. The rules of the Treaty are Member States centred, although the 
European Court of Justice has steadily enlarged the notion of state under 
Community law. Addressee is not the Member State alone, but the three 
constitutional powers, inter alia the adrninistrations. Regional and even local 
institutions have come under a legal obligation to respect the EEC rules56. What 
the Court can do and what the Court is doing within its jurisdiction57 is to stretch 
Community law beyond the institutional frame of the Community legal order. A 
real break-through (and that is what is still needed) would be to use Art. 5 as the 
basis for constructing primary Community law based competences of the 
Comrnission to enter into direct contact with the regional and local authorities in 
order to enhance the enforcement of Community law and vice versa. One might 
even consider the fostering of transboundary cooperation not only of Member 
54 As addressees of the intervention. 
55 Fora comparative view, F.W.Scharpf, Sozialdemokratische Krisenpolitik in Europa, 1987. 
56 Cf. infra Part 1, Chapter 4, 199 et seq. 
57 Cf. from that side, D.Curtin, The Province of Govemment: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives 
Perspective in the Common Law Context, ELR 1990, 195 et seq. 
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States, but of competent regional and local authorities themselves under 
Community law. Especially horizontal effects of Community law seem tobe a 
powerful, though still underdeveloped instrument in Art. 558 . What is at stake 
here, is not so much an obligation of the local and regional authorities as well as 
of the Commission, but a Community competence to build up ties outside the 
national (federal) channel. 
a. Structural deficits 
What the Court really offers, so far, is an opportunity for active, EEC orientated 
local or regional authorities to enforce primary and even secondary law59, 
independent of what the national authorities as the designated primary 
addressees want them to do. They would not be allowed to instruct the respective 
local or regional authorities to stop their activities because such an instruction 
would clearly violate Community law. For the very same reasons private 
industry and commerce would have to obey to measures taken by local and 
regional authorities which are based on Community law. Such a scenario sounds 
utopian, but it has already become reality in the field of environmental 
protection. One wonders whether and to what extent these initiatives are 
sponsored or at least indirectly supported by the Commission60. 
Despite the promising trends to extend the notion of state beyond its mere 
national boundaries, there remains an important deficiency of Community law 
with little or limited hope for change. Member States legislations on product or 
food safety have a clear addressee, the national citizen. Accepting a statutory 
responsibility for the health and safety of citizens does not necessarily mean that 
the addressee gets a legal right which entitles him to participate in the process of 
concretising the statutory responsibility or even a right to sue the competent 
statutory authority to take action61. The situation is much more complex and 
difficult at the Community level. The Court has attributed direct effect to 
primary Community law and in case of non-implementation to directives62. 
58 Cf. J. Temple Lang, Community Constitutional Law, Art. 5 EEC Treaty CMLR 1990, 645 et seq. 
59 In relation to environmental protection, cf. G.Winter, Direktwirkung von Richtlinien, DVBI. 1991, 
657 et seq. who analyses in detail the effects of secondary Community law on the different 
administrative levels. 
60 A similar initiative seems to lie behind the recent proposal of the Commission toset up five regional 
centres which should survey the enforcement ofEuropean consumer law, cf. OJ C 205, 13.8.1992, 10 
et seq. 
61 Cf. infra, Part 1, Chapter 4, 203 et seq. 
62 There is an large literature on the direct effect and or the direct applicability (there is no consistency 
in the terminology) in the doctrine, cf. P. Pescatore, Tue Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease 
ofCommunity Law, 8 (1983), ELR 155 et seq. 
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Direct effect of primary Community law has been the first of the three principles 
which the Court has deveJoped to consider the pecuJiarities of the Treaty of 
Rome as an independent legal order. Those who benefit from direct effect, the 
holders of individual rights, industry and commerce have been and still are the 
driving force for the future development of the European Constitution63 . 
There are not, or not yet, equivalent rights given to consumers. If any, they could 
derive from secondary Community Jaw or from an amendment of the Treaty. But 
even Maastricht does not insert rights to consumers in Art. 129 a64. The Court 
went far in accepting the notion of the consumer as being or becoming the 
addressee of primary Community law. But it has not yet had much occasions to 
specify what the notion really means. There lies potential in the jurisprudence, 
mainly in connecting it to the here proposed new reading of Art. 36. The 
Community legal order, seen as a fully-fledged European constitution, can 
awake to Jife, if responsibiJity has a clear addressee, the European citizen. 
Such a European citizen must be granted rights in the area of health and safety. 
One might wonder, how far the Court of Justice will go. Even if it will replace 
the lacking charter of human rights, it would be necessary to examine what kind 
of charter shall be substituted: The Convention on Human Rights with its notion 
of the liberal state or the SociaJ Charter which gives more weight to sociaJ 
welfare implications of an integrated market65 . The Member States are not only 
rejecting the development of human or citizen rights, they spend a lot of energy 
to exclude consumers from the scope of application of product safety regulation. 
Member States have not yet understood that the consumer, who must be 
regarded as addressee of the regulation (beside the producer), has historica11y 
emerged from the mere subject and has thereby superseded the organized 
subjectivity66. The recently adopted product safety directive is just another piece 
to prove such thinking. Consumers appear only once, in so far as they have to 
contribute to the performance of a recall initiative by a producer of unsafe 
product67. 
63 Cf. H.-W.Micklitz, Organisierte Rechtsdurchsetzung im Binnenmarkt, KritV 1992, 170 et seq. 
64 Cf. for a full understanding of Art. 129 a, H.-W.Micklitz/N.Reich, Verbraucherschutz im Vertrag über 
die Europäische Union, Perspektiven für 1993, EuZW 1992, 593 et seq. 
65 The conceptual difference between the European Convention of Human Rights and the Social Charta 
has not yet been developed in detail. 
66 In more detail, infra III, 2„ 69 et seq. 
67 Cf. Art 14 (1) 01 L 228, l l.8.1992, 24 et seq. 
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b. Building meta-administrations 
Any form of product safety regulation aiming at the management of emergencies 
quite necessarily leads to the establishment of administrative meta-structures, 
where Member States keep their sovereignty and where all sub-levels of 
enforcement beneath the national level are excluded from European decision-
making. Such a meta-structure can be characterised by a twofold phenomenon: lt 
enhances centralisation of enforcement in Member States thereby taking away 
competence and power from the local and regional authorities, that is away from 
the risk managers working with the problems. A European citizen cannot be 
more than an object for such a type of meta-administration. The Member States 
by constantly invoking the danger of competences and powers drifting to 
Brussels find legitimate ground for centralising risk management. The 
administrative structures as foreseen under the directive comply grosso modo to 
such a scenario. Already nowadays, one might realize that some Member States 
cannot resist the temptation. They use the said shift of powers to the Community 
as a disguise for the restructuring of the national administration68. This should 
also serve as a reminder that these issues, arising here in relation to product 
safety, are in fact of much more general application in any appraisal of the 
evolution of the Community/State relationship. 
Management of emergency situations in the Community is treated as a technical 
administrative problem which can be solved by improving information exchange 
and by developing a procedure which allows the extension of national decision 
to all other Member States. This type of bureaucratic management has nothing to 
do with risk management, but a lot to do with state-orientated, state focussed 
over-bureaucratisation of product safety regulation. Developed federations have 
found simpler and less bureaucratic solutions for the same type of problem: 
Mutual recognition, and even non-federalist nations, like the United Kingdom 
reach quasi harmonisation of decision-making by use of the home authority 
principle69 . 
However, such a scenario does not fully eo ver the potential of developing 
administrative structures beyond the national level. A closer analysis 
demonstrates that the European meta-structure contains elements, though in an 
infant stage, which allow management of emergencies close to the citizen which 
by-pass bureaucratic meta-structure. Point 8 of the Technical Annex of the 
product safety directive should be recalled70: 
68 This would be true for the United Kingdom, but is not a unique phenomenon. France demonstrates 
that the contrary is likewise possible. 
69 Cf. St.Weatherill, Reinvigorating the Development of Community Product Safety Policy, 14 Journal 
ofConsumerPolicy, 1991, 171 etseq. 
70 Cf. OJ L 228, 11.8.1992, 24 et seq. 32. 
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"8. At the same time the Commission, when it considers it to be necessary, 
and in order to supplement the information received, can in exceptional 
circumstances institute an investigation of its own motion and/or convene the 
Committee on Emergencies provided for in Article 10 (1) ofthis Directive. 
In the case of such an investigation Member States shall supply the 
Commission with the requested information to the best of their ability ". 
The catch-word is "exceptional circumstances". What it really means is not clear. 
The Comrnission is given wide discretion in defining the existence of 
"exceptional circumstances". In addition to the normal management procedure 
which aims at the technical bureaucratic decision if it is feasible to extend an 
action taken by one Member State to the rest of the Community, the Commission 
can institute an investigation procedure on the existence of an "emergency". So 
what the Commission is really entitled to do here is to initiate risk management. 
lt is entitled to "process" the danger, i.e. to build up information exchange and 
consultation procedures between the experts of the Member States and the 
experts of the Community. Again the directive does not restrain the 
Comrnission's powers in deciding how the investigation should best be 
organized. lt is left to the discretion of the Comrnission, a wise understanding of 
the difficulty to structure the "processing" of emergencies in advance. One might 
bring the extra-investigation power of the Comrnission in relation to the 
explicitly mentioned impossibility to define an "emergency"71 . All that can be 
said on the performance of the investigation procedure can be drawn from the 
general mandate of the Commission to link the investigation procedure to the 
work which is done in all the other comrnittees which have been established in 
recent years along the line of the implementation of the new approach to 
technical harmonization and standards72. lt would not exclude, however, that the 
Comrnission decides to consult external experts, if it deems it tobe necessary. 
Certainly, one should not overestimate the opportunities which are inherent in 
the Commission-managed investigation procedure. The Commission needs 
information input from one of the Member States to start its research activities. lt 
is not allowed to start investigating a risk if it has got the information on a 
regulatory action or on the mere existence of a risk from a source outside the 
rapid exchange system. And the Comrnission shall only investigate the risk, it is 
not allowed to make a decision, not even to propose to take a decision. All that it 
can do is to convene the Committee on Emergency. lt rests upon the Member 
States alone to decide what they will do with the results of the investigation, 
mainly if they believe that an emergency exists and that action-taking is 
71 Cf. OJ L 228, 11.8.1992, 24 et seq. 32, Point 2 of the Annex. 
72 Cf. OJ C 136, 4.6.1985, 1 et seq. and J.Falke, Technische Normung in Europa - Zieht sich der Staat 
wirklich zurück?, in: G.Winter (Hrsg.) Die Europäischen Gemeinschaften und das Öffentliche, ZERP-
DP 7/1991, 79etseq. 
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necessary. lt does not need much fantasy to imagine that the Commission would 
be able to by-pass some of the institutional constraints, like the binding to the 
information input and the right to propose a measure, which both lie in the hands 
of the Member States. The decision monopoly remains, however in the hands of 
the Member States. Despite the not yet fully developed consequences of the 
Commission's power to institute emergency investigation, it might become clear 
that the directive, somewhat hidden in the Annex, provides for procedural 
flexibility, which runs counter to the over-bureaucratic mechanisms on which the 
whole directive focuses. According to us, the opportunity given here in the mere 
investigation is a chance: a chance to allow emergency evaluation and 
emergency management where the problems appear, at the ground level and to 
develop adequate structures beyond the constraints of primary Community law 
and beyond the mechanism foreseen in the directive. The investigation procedure 
breaks down the concentration on States, as it allows cooperation based on 
expertise and not on formal competence and realises the subsidiarity principle, as 
it grants investigation power only if the Member States have failed to process the 
danger73. 
c. Realising the maximisation principle - the new structures for the 
management of emergencies 
The intention of the directive is to create new structures which rest on the old 
well-established mechanisms available in the Member States. Although the 
difficulties and even failures of the established procedures in the management of 
emergencies are foreseeable, the new structures of the directive go beyond mere 
academic interest. They forestall, so runs the hypothesis, the re-shaping of the 
institutional frame within the Community legal order74. And exactly these 
effects are made possible by maximising experience and knowledge built up in 
the Member States. 
The EEC mechanism to manage emergencies in the field of products which 
come under the scope of the product safety directive 75 reflects the three types of 
approaches of the selected Member States. One might understand it as rule-
orientated, because "rules" shall guarantee that the transfer of competence to the 
Commission is controlled and supervised by the Member States. The 
Commission's activities are structurally bound to the powers it gains under the 
73 lt is a double judicialisation of the subsidiarity principle, as the Commission's intervention is bound to 
the prerequisites of Art. 9 a)-d) and the present failure of the Member States to investigate the risk. 
7 4 Cf. infra III, 60 et seq. 
75 Cf. Art. 2 a) OJ 228, 11.8.1992, 24 et seq. 
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directive. The flow chart on the management of emergencies underlines that the 
Commission's possibilities to act are dependent on the Member States, at each 
and every level of the management: in the notification, in the processing, and in 
action taking76. Such a rule guided transfer of competence from the lower to the 
upper level is characteristic of the making of federations. lt is functional for the 
integration of autonomous states into a supranational system77 and insofar the 
rule-guided approach might entail far-reaching consequences beyond the mere 
subject of product safety and the management of emergency situations. 
Pragmatism seems to require quite different ways and means to organise the 
management of emergencies. How best to solve problems would be the guiding 
maxim. Flexibility and the concentration of powers where they are needed are 
characteristic of such thinking. Pragmatism can be found in the differentiation 
between the "normal" management of emergencies and the "special" 
management in case of "exceptional circumstances". The normal procedure aims 
at harmonising a regulatory decision to restrict the marketing of a dangerous 
product beyond national borders. If Member States come to an agreement on 
what to do, the Commission's role is to provide a forum and to function as a 
catalyst. There is no need to transfer powers to the Commission. The normal 
type of management under Art. 9 seems to have such a situation in mind. If, 
however, Member States cannot reach an agreement on what to do, once a 
potential emergency has come up78, the Comrnission is given a right to step in 
without any further explicit decision of the Member States which give the 
Comrnission the right to do so. The directive itself provides the Commission 
with that power. The interrelationship between both procedures and the ultimate 
power of the Commission to compensate for the failure of the Member States, 
give rise to soft pressure on the Member States to ensure compliance with the 
philosophy of the directive. 
But why is the EEC procedure "democratic"? There is a linkage between the 
Spanish and the Portuguese instrumentalisation of consumer protection and the 
adoption of a consumer product safety directive, both exercised and both pushed 
in order to promote the development of "democracy". Consumer protection apart 
from Spain and Portugal, has arisen out of the need to compensate for market 
failures and to re-install the consumer as a partner in the market economy. There 
is much discussion in the Member States on the role and function of consumer 
protection beyond its instrumentalisation for the workability of the market 
76 Cf. flow charts on emergencies, annexes to the national reports, !ist of graphs, VII. 
77 Again one might refer to the Norddeutsche Bund. 
78 The directive differentiales between the notification of measures and the notification of risks, Art. 8. 
Notification of risks is not mandatory, though already done by some Member States, cf. J.Falke, What 
should be the Content of a Horizontal Product Safety Policy for the European Community, BEUC 
Legal News No. 16 (1986), 16 et seq. 
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economy79 . Put into the frame of our analysis the question was and the question 
still is whether consumer protection is or might become a vehicle for social 
reform, for developing more rights for consumers and for integrating them into 
the law-making and the enforcement procedure80. Spain and Portugal have 
introduced new elements to the potential power of consumer protection: the 
notion of democracy and democratisation. Consumer protection, especially in 
combination with environmental protection, is linked to the shaping of a new 
democracy, it is bound to real historic movements even outside the narrow field 
of consumer protection. Both are more or less true for the role and function of 
consumer protection at the Community level. Consumer protection might 
become a driving force in the Community to develop democratic structures. The 
transfer of responsibility for health and safety from the Member States to the 
Community entails a definition of the potential addressee. The addressee must be 
after all the EC-citizen, and he or she is most of all a consumer in a market 
society such as the European Community. The recognition of the consumer as an 
EC-subject will heavily influence the structures to manage product safety. So far, 
these structures are state-orientated, but the consumer is already knocking at the 
door. He or she is more than a mere market partner. lt might weil be that a 
process of democratisation is initiated by the consumers81 . Spanish and 
Portuguese experience might pave the way for taking the next steps, although 
one must admit that the potential of the role of the consumer in the Community 
is not yet developed, not even in the directive on product safety. lt might well, 
however, be that the discretion left to the Commission in the shaping of the 
investigation procedure produces the necessary incentives for developing the 
role of consumers beyond the frame of primary Community law and beyond the 
frame of the directive. 
III. Theory of regulating emergencies and managing emergencies in 
practice 
The leading hypothesis is based on possible discrepancies between "should be 
structures" and the application of the rules in concrete emergency situations. 
79 In terms of N. Reich, Markt und Recht, 1977, it is the difference between "marktkomplementären" 
and "marktkompensatorischen" measures. 
80 Cf. M. Goyens, Consumer Protection in a Single European Market: What Challenges for the EC 
Agenda? CMLR 1992, 71 et seq. 
81 Ausbau der Demokratie durch den Ausbau des Rechtsstaates, U.K.Preuß, Perspektiven von 
Rechtsstaat und Demokratie, KJ 1989, 1 et seq. and from the same author, Revolution, Fortschritt, 
Verfassung, Berlin 1990. 
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Both aspects have been dealt with separately in the preceding chapters. Now it 
comes down to verify the hypothesis, to confront the results of the analysis of the 
typology with the management of concrete emergencies and to elaborate where 
the discrepancies are to be found and what they Iook like. lt is helpful to follow 
the same criteria, the same yardstick which has already been used for the 
analysis of the typology. 
Grosso modo discrepancy exists, but only in countries which do provide for 
management rules, be they of an administrative nature, procedural or 
instrumental character. Where no such rules exist, or where the rules are 
extremely flexible, should be structures are almost congruent with present 
management of an emergency. This is particularly true for the United Kingdom 
where the administrative structures are loosely-knit and where the setting of the 
research, the presumed discrepancy between "should be" and "as it is" has met 
incomprehension and has in itself set incentives for a crossborder exchange of 
legal cultures. Categorising the UK thinking as pragmatic is an attempt to 
summarise reservations against the hypothesis and to express them into one 
catch-word82. From the perspective of a continental Iawyer83, however, the 
hypothesis holds true even in countries like the United Kingdom, might be to a 
lesser extent than in other countries. But the United Kingdom has developed 
administrative structures by law, an approach which in itself may be challenged 
by the present management of an emergency. 
What needs tobe elaborated is the assumption that administrative structures (the 
different levels of action), proceedings (information exchange and consultation) 
and instruments (means of intervention) are developed in the course of the 
management of the emergency situations. New structures are created according 
to the needs of the emergency situations, which challenge the even constitutional 
shaping of competences, new actors appear which are legally not integrated in 
the processing of the emergency, they participate in the information exchange, 
they are consulted and they prepare the ground for action. Last but not least 
instruments are developed which simply do not exist in national laws. 
If it is true that emergency situations generate new structures, new procedures 
and new instruments, those who are making the mies attract the attention, i.e. the 
emergency managers. Their behaviour and their way of acting is guided by 
responsibility, experience and autonomy84. All three are structurally needed to 
meet the challenge of an emergency type situation, it is not an individual ability 
alone. Responsibility, experience and autonomy characterise what is called 
82 Cf. supra, II. 47 et seq. 
83 The perspective plays a key role in the comparative analysis, cf. G. Frankenberg, Critical 
Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, Harvard International Law Journal 26 (1985), 411 et 
seq. 
84 Cf. infra, Part I, Chapter 3, 89 et seq. 
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professionalization or professionalised management85. Professionalization 
functions as a catalyst for theory and practice, for should be structure and 
enforcement. Frame structures, procedural rules and basic instruments are still 
needed, but they are of a relative value only in the concrete management. The 
message which could be drawn from the striking discrepancy is undoubtedly 
clear: structures, procedures and instruments should grant lee-way for those who 
apply the law, for the professionalized emergency managers. What is desirable, 
is not so much a clearly shaped administrative structure supplemented by a 
sophisticated procedure, which defines and restricts (!) the space for action of the 
emergency managers, but legal rules which set incentives for an autonomous, 
nevertheless responsible handling of an emergency. Overlapping of competences 
might be more helpful than clear-cut border lines and duplication of activities 
should not be prevented but even, at least in limits, enhanced. 
Such a consequence which comes already near to a political mandate for the law-
making instances, the national parliaments and the Community organs, should 
not be misinterpreted: Although the structures, procedures and instruments are 
defined in the process of managing an emergency, they are not homogeneous. lt 
is not possible to elaborate finely-tuned rules which are applicable to any kind of 
an emergency. lt lies within the logic of an emergency that the effects it 
produces and the traces it leaves in product safety legislation are not foreseeable, 
at least not beyond a certain level of discretion. The rules are the result of the 
concrete emergency situation which has to be handled. Within the handling of 
concrete emergency situations the different regulatory philosophies, the different 
approaches to elaborate a management of emergencies in the Member States 
come into play. The result is a broad heterogeneity in the way the emergency is 
handled, from the notification, via the processing to the action-taking. The broad 
variety of the management traditions as broken down in the three approaches -
rule-orientated, pragmatic and democratic86 - is getting even more complex 
due to the inherent differences between consumer goods and foodstuffs. The 
management of consumer goods is open to day to day experience, the 
management of foodstuffs requires complicated laboratory testing. Particular 
regulatory traditions have to be made compatible with the specifics of the 
consumer goods and foodstuffs. The way in which the emergency is handled 
does not only depend on the respective national regulatory traditions, it is 
likewise contingent upon the type of the product, a consumer good, a foodstuff 
or even another product like drugs or medicines87. 
85 Cf. infra, Part I, Chapter 3, 89 et seq. 
86 Cf. supra, 41 et seq. 
87 This is to say, that the latter categories produce to some extent their own management structures 
which will certainly differ from those at stake here. 
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The findings cannot leave a lawyer satisfied: What is the importance of Iaws and 
regulations, if they are not applied strictu sensu, but reformulated in present 
practice?88 Product safety law suggests that emergencies can be managed in 
order to improve the protection of citizens. Can these policy objectives be 
pursued, if law enforcement is no longer application of predefined rules as 
approved by national parliaments, if application really means to re-write the law 
according to the needs of the emergency? The practical solutions which were 
found in the concrete emergencies and which were investigated in depth in the 
case studies, cannot be blamed for being unfair. One might put into question the 
concrete management because the handling remained in the hands of experts 
where there was no access for consumer groups, one might criticize the 
management for having informed the public too late, or for binding the recall of 
the incriminated products to a more or less substantial contribution on behalf of 
the consumers. But, whoever raises doubts on the management has to find an 
answer to the question which inevitably will be raised: would management in 
accordance with the legally defined structures, following the legally determined 
procedures and under consideration of the provided legal instruments have led to 
better or even quicker results? 
The closer analysis of the divergences cannot provide an answer to that question, 
but it may help to understand better why legal rules and management in 
emergency situations clash together and it will hopefully elaborate the 
perspectives for a European management of emergency situations under the 
given frame of the recently adopted product safety directive. As it has not yet 
entered into force, Member States have to transform the directive into national 
laws by the 29th June 1994, the management can only be prospective in nature. 
And the years to come will demonstrate whether the forecast undertaken based 
on the experience collected in the Member States and in the Commission on the 
already existing national and European regulatory schemes can be useful at all. 
Again, the management of emergencies writes its own rules, develops its own 
structures, its own procedures and its own instruments. 
1. The emergency- legal definitions and practical handling at the Member 
States' level 
The findings of the study are as such: The identification of a case as an 
"emergency" is the result of a complex social procedure in which the parties 
involved weigh and measure "risks", "dangers" and "damage", in order tobe able 
to decide whether it is an "emergency". Legislators respond to the social 
88 Cf. M.v.Gestel/G.M.F.Snijders, Dutch report, Part II, Chapter 8, 347 et seq. 
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conceptualization and develop more and more sophisticated notions of safety, 
risk, <langer, damage and - even emergency89. One might distinguish three 
different approaches to the phenomenon of an emergency which differs from a 
risk and a <langer: 
( 1) The first consists in explicitly introducing in one and the same legislation 
different notions of dangers covering mere risks, dangers and emergencies. This 
has been done so in the UK Health and Safety at W ork Act. The inspectors 
entrusted with the enforcement of the act have to decide whether he "has 
reasonable cause to believe .. (that the case in question) .. is a cause of imminent 
<langer of serious personal injury"90. Without explaining what an "imminent 
<langer" means, one might conclude that there are different degrees of dangers 
and that the blatant threat to the personal integrity indicates the existence of an 
emergency type situation. The Spanish legislation follows the same thinking in 
that it puts the trigger mechanism of statutory intervention in emergency type 
situations near to criminal activities: "ignorance, negligence or fraud situations 
which are determinant of an indiscriminate attack against the consumers"91 . The 
relatively low threshold for intervention must be seen in the light of the Colza 
Case, where Spanish hawkers sold poisoned olive-oil to low-income consumers. 
Portuguese legislation92 seems to be in line with the French "Loi sur la Securite 
des Consommateurs"93. 
(2) The second way of defining emergency situations which differ from the 
normal handling of risks and dangers may be reported from the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands. lt is a more indirect way to draw the attention of those who 
implement the law to the fact that there are different "degrees of dangers". The 
Consumer Protection Act envisages a distinction between "normal risks" and 
"emergencies". The latter may be tackled by an "expedited" safety regulation, 
made where the Secretary of State believes an order needs to be made without 
delay. The statute deliberately leaves the assessment to be made by the 
responsible politicians. lt is up to the Minister to decide whether or not the threat 
is such that an "expedited" order is necessary94. The same mechanism can be 
found in the Netherlands95. The Commodity Act provides for the possibility to 
issue an "emergency provision" by means of an ministerial order. This means 
89 Especially in the regulation of chemicals differentiation has already reached a degree which seems to 
be beyond of what is possible to administer by the enforcement authorities, cf. OECD Administrative 
and Legislative Aspects of Chemicals Control: Comparative Analysis of Selected Issues ( 195). 
90 Cf. St. Weatherill, UK report, Part II, Chapter 10, 443 et seq. 
91 Cf. M.L6pez-Sanchez, Spanish report, Part II, Chapter9, 423 et seq. 
92 Cf. Calvao da Silva, Portuguese report, Part II, Chapter 8, 362 et seq. 
93 Cf. M.-Christine Heloire, Le Contröle de Ja Commercialisation des Produits Industriels en France au 
Regard de la Securite des Consommateurs, in: H.W.Micklitz, Post Market Control of Consumer 
Goods, loc.cit, 213 et seq. 
94 Cf. St.Weatherill, UK report, Part II, Chapter 10, 443 et seq. 
95 Cf. M.v.Gestel/G.M.F.Snijders, Dutch report, Part II, Chapter 7, 347 et seq. 
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that the mm1ster may impose rules in case these are urgently needed in the 
interest of the consumers' health or safety. Again the legislation suggests that it 
will be up to the Minister to decide whether there is an emergency type situation. 
(3) The third way is to define rules for the management of "emergency 
situations" at the administrative level. These rules bind the authorities but do not 
imply legal effects towards third parties. Such an approach might be spread 
wider than we suppose. Such rules are not publicly available and not published. 
They exist in the Federal Republic of Germany in the management of emergency 
situations in foodstuffs96. Similar rules have most recently been adopted by the 
Department of Health and Industry97 in the UK. 
So, those who enforce the law in day-to-day practice and who might discover 
subsequent to a routine investigation, a risky or dangerous product or to whom a 
risk or a danger has been notified by third parties, are more or less left alone with 
the identification of a risk as an emergency-type situation. Whatever the rules are 
and even if a Minister will decide in the end whether the risky or the dangerous 
situation is indeed an emergency situation requiring the issue of an order, it is the 
inspector in the field who first handles the problem. The regulatory input from 
the law can provide him with limited assistance only. The regulatory discretion 
is a necessary prerequisite for bringing to bear the different regulatory traditions. 
The German and the Dutch officers rely first on legal rules and technical 
standards which should at least in theory guide the evaluation of an emergency. 
Relying on rules, and that is relying on technical standards, does not mean that 
the officers are legally bound to application of the Standards. Under German law 
they are not bound, but they have to start from the assumption that a product 
which complies with the technical standards meets the requirements of the law. 
But the officers are part of the complex network of technical standards which 
define the safety level. They are trained in the administration of standards, often 
they even participate in one way or the other in their elaboration. So it is evident, 
that in case of an emergency type situation they will first refer to technical 
Standards, if there are any. This thinking might explain the key role which the 
certification mark which was attributed to the incriminated office chairs by a 
Southern German certification body, has played in the management of risk. The 
"Fachausschuß Verwaltung"98 being in charge of managing the situation, had to 
overcome the obstacle of a seemingly sufficient certification mark before it 
could develop its own management concept99. 
96 Cf. J.Falke, German report, Part II, Chapter 6, 261 et seq. 
97 Cf. Statutory Code of Practice on Local Authority Action in Dealing with Food Hazard Waming 
Systems, cf. Ch. Willet, UK report, Part II, Chapter 10, 481 et seq. 
98 The "Fachausschuß Verwaltung" belongs to the Berufsgenossenschaft, the Industrial lnjuries 
Insurance Institution. 
99 Cf. J.Falke, German report, Part II, Chapter 6, 310 et seq. 
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The UK officers take a much more pragmatic attitude. Once they have realized 
that a product is "dangerous" they start investigating it whatever the rules are100. 
They do not feel bound by any rules, not even by the technical standards of BSI. 
They would not even start their work by looking at these rules. The general 
safety requirement under the revised Consumer Protection Act leaves them 
enough discretion to take the appropriate steps in finding out whether there is an 
ernergency. The ernergency managers rely on their experience and on what they 
can detect101 . The UK approach strongly enhances the introduction of a general 
safety requirement which sets aside the reference to standards and the 
presumption which is bound to cornpliance under German law102. One rnight 
associate the UK way of evaluating the existence of an emergency as an 
inductive rnethod. lt is focused on the emergency evaluation step by step 
according to the situated needs. There is no formal assessment103 . And as far as 
we can see from the interviews, UK officers would strongly reject any 
formalization of the evaluation procedure. 
The UK thinking is not unique, it is neither bound to a specific country nor to a 
specific product group. In present practice, it can be found mainly today in the 
evaluation of dangerous foodstuffs. The German evaluation procedure in the 
case of foodstuffs seems tobe sirnilar to the UK approach1°4. Evaluation lies in 
the hands of the Chemische Untersuchungsämter (chernical laboratories), who 
have to decide on the existence of the "risk", but they have no regulatory power. 
One might even conclude that the chernical laboratories are not able to act as 
emergency managers. Technical-scientific data are theoretically not connected to 
social decision taking. They do not contain in themselves the means to be 
transforrned from "data" into "assessrnent". Social assessment needs tobe done, 
but not by those who perform the testing. 
Separating technical-scientific evaluation frorn social decision making could 
strengthen, at least in theory, freedorn of technical-scientific research, in contrast 
to mere testing, weighting and rneasuring. They rnight realize that they are not 
responsible for decision-making, they could then concentrate on the 
investigation of the "risk", beyond all rules and standards restricting their work. 
Laboratories, however, apply a standard set of testing procedures. Standardised 
testing procedures should allow cornparability of testing and the opportunity to 
100 Cf. Ch. Willet, UK report, Part II, Chapter 10, 481 et seq. 
J 01 lt is striking to see that a German engineer when being confronted with the UK approach raised the 
question on what eise one can rely than on rules! 
102 That is why the product safety directive presents such a substantial and far reaching progress, cf. H.-
W.Micklitz, Die Richtlinie über die allgemeine Produktsicherheit vom 29.6.1992, VuR 1992, 261 et 
seq.; J. Keßler, Produktischerheit im Europäischen Binnenmarkt, EuZW 1993, 751 et seq. 
103 Cf. St.Weatherill, UK report, Part II, Chapter 10, on the notion of risk assessment, what it means to 
UK lawyers and why there is no formal risk assessment in the UK, 476 et seq. 
104 Cf. J.Falke, German report, Part II, Chapter 6, 237 et seq. 
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reproduce the testing results by applying the very same procedure. They 
represent a basic routine of technical scientific allowing for the discovery of 
standardised risk situations, but they do not respond to the unforeseen or yet 
unknown event, but that inherent to the notion of an emergency. Again rules, 
even if they provide for standardised testing, are somewhat counterproductive to 
the management of emergencies. They may at best help first to identify, that 
there is "something" which must then be investigated in depth, outside and 
beyond the testing rules. 
Spain and Portugal contribute a quite specific and much different input to the 
debate on the right way of approaching emergency evaluation, by rules or by 
pragmatics. For them, risk management has much broader societal 
implicationsl05. Both countries have just started to build up the respective 
legislation, to create institutions for risk management not only at the 
administrative level but also at the technical-scientific level, to engage 
employees to whom the surveillance is entrusted. The mere fact that they are 
now able to survey the market and take measures to increase the safety of 
citizens is seen as apart of democratizing society. It seems tobe as if emergency 
management is guided by this perspective, which means that the German/Dutch 
and UK conflict does not concem them. They rnight find their own way, a way 
which will certainly not rely on technical and scientific expertise alone. lt is 
accompanied at least in Spain by a constant conflict between the national 
government and the autonomous regions on the division of power in the 
regulation and enforcement of consumer protection legislation 106. 
So far we have tried to evaluate foodstuffs and non-food products altogether. 
There seems to be, however, a major difference which is inherent to the product 
categories and which therefore could be valid for all investigated countries. 
Whether or not a technical consumer good may constitute an emergency is 
mostly subject to every day life experience. There was no debate in the office 
chair case that the chairs were rea11y dangerous and that urgent action was 
needed. The point of conflict was to find out where the <langer came from, who 
was responsible and what kind of action should be taken. One might even go one 
step further and conclude that even the users were able to discover the existence 
of a <langer. The same cannot and perhaps has never been said for dangerous 
foodstuffs. Whether or not a foodstuff is dangerous and requires an emergency 
type action is subject to complicated chernical testing procedures. The users 
might feel i1I after having eaten unsafe food but they seldom know where their 
ill-feeling is corning from. The professionals involved in the chemical testing 
procedure sometimes do not even know what they should search for. The 
105 Cf. M-L6pez-Sanchez, Spanish report, Part II, Chapter 9, 402 et seq. 
106 Cf. M.-A.L6pez-Siinchez, Spanish report, Part II, Chapter 9, 404 et seq. 
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perception of the <langer is no longer bound to every day-life experience either of 
the injured parties or of the technical scientific inspectors. Perception of <langer 
is the result of a scientific evaluation procedure. 
There are counter-rotating principles to be found in the two product categories. 
The social, political and legal development points into the direction of 
scientification and standardisation. That development furthers the dissolution of 
responsibilities, standardisation and scientification replaces responsibilities. 
Especially consumer organisations push for a more scientific approach on risk 
evaluation especially in the regulation of technical consumer goods. This means: 
legal definitions of what an emergency might be, rule-induced standards to guide 
the inspector in the evaluation of the risk. This trend is not dependent on the 
structural difference between risks which can be identified by everybody and 
risks which require technical-scientific investigation in order to be discovered. lt 
seems to be as if the regulation on foodstuffs and chemicals functions as a 
forerunner for the development in the field of consumer goods. It is indeed a 
social development which encornpasses more and more parts of the society107. 
Ernbedded in this drive for more standardisation and more scientification is the 
need to increase professionalization of risk management. The ernergency 
managers are structurally invited to take over responsibility beyond 
standardisation and scientification due to their professionalization. lt is true that 
they are primarily bound to routine inspections which exclude the transfer of 
responsibilities. But the reluctance against the effects of standardisation and 
scientification is increasing. The food inspectors become aware of the problem 
that routine inspections do not suffice to discover unsafe foodstuffs. They have 
to rely on their experience and autonomy and make samples even in cases where 
a systematic evaluation of the risks in the laboratories has taken place, but do not 
show the presumed results. Just one example taken from the case studies: the 
German "Chemische Untersuchungsämter" have tried to get a grip on wide-
spread marketing of the poisoned wine by taking samples from the big dealers' 
storages. But just incidentally, they discovered that two bottles being filled by 
the same dealer showed different results\08. Routine inspections do not suffice! 
The intention is not to discriminate against technical-scientific routine 
inspections dedicated to assist the risk evaluation, but to pin-point that technical 
scientific methods do not suffice and that it can not replace the experience and 
the autonomy of the individual inspectors. 
One might make a strong argument of counter-productive results in the area of 
foodstuffs against the ongoing discussion on a stronger input in the regulation of 
107 Education would be another example, where the privatisation \eads to new regulatory structures and 
instruments, somewhat similar to the regulation of technical standards. 
108 Cf. J.Falke, German report, Part II, Chapter 6, 297 et seq. 
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dangerous technical consumer goods. Those working on a practical level resist, 
this was a common plea in all the interviews, to bind their control activities to 
even stronger and more sophisticated rules whatever their legal character might 
be. They feel already today overregulated and restricted in their autonomy which 
they see as being substantial for an effective risk evaluation. 
Autonomy is another catch-word in the risk evaluation. Inspectors do not only 
remain sceptical about rules and regulations, they defend their autonomy 
particularly in transboundary conflicts. The overall policy of the Commission is 
to promote the idea of mutual recognition especially in the field of risk 
assessment by setting up if not common but at least similar conditions for the 
risk evaluation in order to make them comparable. lt is precisely this observation 
which allows us to use product safety as a reflection of much broader issues 
which arise in the development of European federalism. In any sector of 
integration it is essential to address the question of how diverse national 
traditions can be accommodated within a wider transnational structure, driven by 
the influence of market integration. 
Present practice in the management of emergency situations puts these efforts in 
the category of wishful thinking. There is an overall tendency in all countries 
once a risk is notified to start testing according to the countries' standards and 
philosophies. Take the example of the office chairs: although the German 
authorities had initiated substantial and comprehensive testing, the British 
authorities once they were informed by a Swedish source, started their own 
testing programme109. Here a real conflict emerged, as the British authorities 
considered the German procedure to be flawed 110. The conflict was not whether 
the chairs were dangerous or not but what kind of testing procedures should be 
developed to assess the risk mainly with view to the intended revision of the 
underlying technical standard. There seems to be only one situation where 
Member States and their authorities are willing to rely on foreign testing: when 
the emergency seems to be no Ionger an emergency and where action taking is 
no more than an alibi to satisfy the people's need. 
2. Structures, procedures and decision-making - theory and reality at the 
Member States Level 
Whereas the laws tend to spell out more and more the administrative and legal 
structures, to enhance institutional independence, to rank degrees of safety, risk, 
<langer, damage and emergency, to broaden the spectrum of instruments to 
109 Cf. St.Weatherill, UK report, Part II, Chapter 10, 463 et seq. 
110 Cf. St.Weatherill, UK report, Part II, Chapter 10, 467 et seq. 
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guarantee the flow of information and to facilitate decision-making, practice 
develops its own management rules in the shadow of administrative and legal 
structures 111 . 
Summarizing112 the main trends of product safety regulation along the line of the 
various charts on the administrative structure, the exchange of information, the 
consultation and the decision-makingl 13, shall prepare the ground for their 
confrontation with the main findings of the current practice of managing 
emergency situations. 
( 1) The project on post market control of consumer goods undertaken for the 
Commission of the European Communities is not even four years old114. The 
trends found there in developing safety regulation have even come clearer since 
then. Member States devote more and more attention to the regulation of 
emergencies at the organisational, procedural and instrumental level. The 
reasons for this steadily growing process of differentiation have not yet been 
investigated115 • Legislators do not regard existing structures and legal means to 
be sufficient to cope with emergency situations. Emergency situations are 
separated from routine praxis. Such a reading sounds plausible, though no one 
can teil us in advance what an emergency is, neither the legislator nor those who 
apply the law. Regulating emergencies could indicate a shift in product safety 
policy, away from routine management to the concentration on emergencies. 
Comprehensive routine inspection is no langer fully put under administrative 
control. Routine inspections could be downgraded to some form of a pre-
procedure preparing the selection and elimination of all those risks which do not 
come under the category of emergencies or - to put it in other words - which 
do not require speedy action on behalf of the authorities. The differentiation 
might even pave the way for privatising the control of dangerous products in 
granting consumers and their organisations a group action to secure compliance 
with the law116. Administrative authorities could concentrate their resources on 
what should remain in the hands of public powers: The management of 
emergencies which, because of the intensity of the risk, require 
professionalization ofthe management117 . 
11 l In the shadow of the law, has been a catch-word in the seventies to enlighten the differences between 
the law in the books and the law in action. 
112 Summarizing and not presenting: basic results can already be found in previous research undertaken 
by ZERP in the field of product safety, cf. Ch. Joerges et a\„ loc.cit. and H.-W.Micklitz (ed.), Post 
Market Contro\ of Consumer Goods, loc.cit. 
113 Cf. supra II. 2„ 47 et seq. 
114 Cf. H.-W. Micklitz (ed.) Post Marke! Control ofConsumer Goods, loc.cit. 
115 Although they are part of a societal change which involves the philosophy. 
116 lt could therefore support the lang debated insertion of a group action in the field of product safety, 
which does already exist in France, without playing a role, however, cf. J. Calais-Auloy, Droit de la 
Consommation, 3e edition 1992, 38 l et seq. 
117 For the concept of professionalisation, cf. infra Part!, Chapter 3, 89 et seq. 
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The previous study on post market control 118 had recognized a trend towards 
institutional independence in the management of product safety. But, even these 
newly established independent bodies do not suffice to handle emergency 
situations, at least not in federal states like the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Spain. The Spanish legislator (and this is an important novelty) allows the 
national government to create in the most serious situations of ignorance, 
negligence or fraud a so called "exceptional organ". lt is composed of the 
national government and the regions and is empowered to take regulatory action 
in case of an emergency. Since the adoption of the law, there has been no reason 
to bring the organ into operation. 
The Guiding Principles (Allgemeine Leitsätze) for the management of 
emergency situations in the management of foodstuffs, which were developed in 
the Federal Republic of Germany subsequent to the poisoned wine case pursue 
the same objective. An ad-hoc gremium should be established composed of the 
German Länder and the Federal Ministry of Health in order to guarantee 
coordinated action. lt is no coincidence, that federal states tend to put the 
management of emergencies in the hands of the competent authorities at the 
central level. Enforcement here lies normally in the hands of the independent 
regions. They may take differing actions, thereby making nation-wide 
management difficult. 
There is, however, another element inherent in the tendency of taking the 
competence away from the regions and putting it in the hands of the central 
level, and it has nothing to do with product safety, but a lot to do with division of 
powers. And the tendency is not even restricted to federal states. Central 
governments tend to aggregate regulatory competence in their hands in order to 
strengthen their position. And the Community with its focus on states 
encourages and even promotes, unintentionally, that development119. 
The division between a normal and an emergency procedure seems to be well-
established despite the remaining doubts on its usefulness and its political and 
social background. The distinction exists in the UK, between the normal and the 
"expedited" procedure in the regulation of technical consumer goods, it exists in 
the Netherlands who have introduced in the 1988 amendments to the Commodity 
Act a form of speed-up procedure. Similar trends may be reported from Spain 
and Portugal120. There is no such distinction under German law, but the Guiding 
Principles fulfil the same function in the management of emergency situations in 
the regulation of foodstuffs. Spanish and Portuguese legislation covers foodstuffs 
118 Cf. H.-W. Micklitz (ed.) Post Market Control, loc.cit. 
119 Cf. St. Weatherill, Shaping structures, Part 1, Chapter 10, 199 et seq. 
120 Cf. M.-A. L6pez-Sanchez, Spanish report, Part II, Chapter 9, 404 et seq. 
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and technical consumer goods. Both provide for specific procedures in the case 
of an imminent risk. 
lt is astonishing to see the similarities of the procedure although there are 
differences in the regulation of technical consumer goods and foodstuffs and 
although the legal basis and regulatory philosophy differs. The overall objective 
of the newly introduced procedures is to effectuate the flow of information in the 
administrations involved, to integrate systematically the technical and scientific 
expertise in the decision-making process, to concentrate the regulatory power in 
the hands of the central government or the central authorities, and to restrict 
participation of the interested parties concerned in order to avoid an undue delay 
of the decision121 . 
The last characteristic of the management of the emergency situations consists in 
the development of adequate regulatory instruments. Whatever the instruments 
which can be taken, they are of a temporary character only. Decision-making is 
only provisional, the responsible bodies reserve the right to revise the decisions, 
to confirm or to repeal them after the time limit has run out. There is a 
relationship between the intensity of the regulatory intervention and the level at 
which it is taken. Strang intervention means in principle that the decision is 
taken at the national Ieve1122. The most important and the most debated legal 
instrument in the management of emergency situations is the competence to 
inform the public 123. The first question is whether such competence exists and 
the second is to whom it is or should be conferred. Some countries have 
explicitly regulated the competence to inform the public. This is true for the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Here the Ministry is in charge of deciding 
whether and under what conditions the public can be warned. The Spanish 
legislation entitles the Ad Hoc Commission to distribute the results of the studies 
which have been taken to evaluate the risk. The Municipal Offices of Consumer 
Information are empowered to inform the consumers on data about the products 
or services which were suspended, confiscated, or forbidden because of their 
risks or danger to personal health and safety. This power concerns individual 
information only. Municipal Offices of Consumer Information are allowed to 
publish test results and risk assessment. There is a competence to inform the 
public on risks and the evaluation which is professionally made. The decision of 
what to do with the dangerous products is left to consumers124. 
U nder German law there is no such competence to inform and to warn the 
public. lt is at least not explicitly contained in the respective legal statutes. But 
121 Cf. flow charts information management in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, national reports, Part II, !ist of graphs, VII. 
122 Cf. J. Falke, German report, Part II, Chapter 6, 261 et seq„ 291 et seq. 
123 See again the flow charts of information management, national reports, Part II, !ist of graphs, VII. 
J 24 Cf. M.-A.L6pez-Sanchez, Spanish report, Part II, Chapter 9, 404 et seq. 
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there is an ongoing debate whether and under what conditions the Länder as well 
as the central govemment can derive the competence to warn from their 
constitutional duty to protect the citizen against risks resulting form unsafe 
products. A non-binding solution has been found in the Guiding Principles 
(Allgemeine Leitsätze) where the competence to warn is put in the hands of the 
Ministry of Health 125. The existence of a competence to warn entrusted to the 
competent authorities is in principle not denied. The conditions, however, under 
which it can be executed are subject to a highly controversial and extremely 
politically important debate. The case of the German noodles should be recalled 
where the intermediate regional level in Baden-Württemberg issued a warning 
that certain types of noodles were unsafe 126. An important German producer, 
Birke!, brought the case before the courts. The Court of Appeal confirmed the 
decision of the court at the first instance which blamed the intermediate regional 
level for having informed the public without having taking the necessary 
investigations to evaluate the risks. And it seemed to be as if the noodles were 
safe! 
(2) If an emergency occurs, the organisational, the procedural and even the 
instrumental rules are set aside. Negotiation in the shadow of the law is the most 
wide-spread solution to tackle safety problems. The investigation undertaken, 
then allows the elaboration of responses in the shadow of the law and the 
breaking down of the rules which govem that management. 
There is a need in emergency-type situations to make use of ad-hoc committees 
which can be legally set up or where no such possibility exists to establish an ad-
hoc forum for enabling better management. This is particularly true for the 
Federal Republic of Germany where the Fachausschuß Verwaltung managed the 
risks resulting from unsafe office chairs and not, as one might expect, statutory 
authorities at whatever level and under whatever composition 127. The 
Fachausschuß has no regulatory competence. lt may not even manage 
emergency situations. lt took responsibility for the management by the mere fact 
that its pluralist composition made it an appropriate organ to bring together all 
those who are involved in the regulation and the management of product safety. 
The same ad-hoc approach can be found in the UK in the management of the 
exploding office chairsl28. The eo-operative approach is constitutive for UK 
thinking even in the enforcement procedure. 
Although there is a common trend to establish ad-hoc committees, there is no 
common strategy to be found in the membership of the management committees. 
The Fachausschuß Verwaltung got involved in the management because it could 
125 Cf. J.Falke, German report, Part II, Chapter 6, 261 et seq. 
126 Cf. J.Falke, German report, Part II, Chapter 6, 261 et seq. 
127 Cf. J.Falke, German report, Part II, Chapter 6, 310 et seq. 
128 Cf. St. Weatherill, UK report, Part II, Chapter 10, 467 et seq. 
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take over professional responsibility for the undiscovered insufficiencies of the 
southem certification mark. The private involvement of the Fachausschuß can be 
interpreted as an attempt to compensate for the failure in having relied for too 
long on a misleading certification mark. Quite the contrary is true in the 
management of the German wine case. The authorities which first got the 
notification took a very low profile in the management of the emergency 
situation129. With all due care, one might conclude that organisational 
constraints, even if they are rooted in constitutional requirements, do not present 
a barrier for setting up an efficient management body, even under private 
governance. 
The procedural rules - information exchange and consultation - which have 
been analyzed in the country reports, are often the direct result of insufficiencies 
which have been discovered in the management of a previous emergency-type 
situation. This is true for the Guiding Principles (Allgemeine Leitsätze) but is 
also true for the Spanish rules which go back to the Colza-case. Accidents 
produce legal interventions and they set incentives for the development of often 
internal, i.e. inner-administrative management rules. lt is therefore somewhat 
misleading to refer to the procedural rules in the structural analysis. Their 
workability has often not been tested. But what can be said from the analysis of 
the case studies is this: The procedural rules, if there are any, are adapted to the 
needs of the case in question. These findings concern the composition of the 
committees, where technical-scientific competence and regulatory competence is 
brought together in one and the same gremium. This is true for the management 
committees in the UK130 and in the Federal Republic of Germany 131 . Access to 
information problems, if one sets aside the access of consumers and their 
organisations132, are practically eliminated. A cooperative approach facilitates 
considerably the decision as to who pays for the necessary testing. Case studies 
indicate that solutions were found on a pragmatic basis. Normally, the 
responsible competent bodies covered the testing costs. ff they were not in the 
budget of (let us assume) the local or the regional authorities, the federal or the 
central governments stepped in and mandated the testing institutions or 
laboratoriesl33. 
A common element of the procedure seems to be that the parties concerned, the 
manufacturers and dealers, are integrated into the risk evaluation and decision-
129 Cf. J.Falke. German report, Part II, Chapter 6, 297 et seq. 
130 Cf. St.Weatherill, UK report, Part II, Chapter 10, 470 et seq. 
131 Cf. J .Falke, German report, Part II, Chapter 6, 297 et seq. 
132 The Consumer Policy Service had initiated a study on access of information of consumers in the late 
eighties, but the idea has not been pursued in resent years. 
133 In the Federal Republic of Germany the producers of the spare part which finally solved the problems 
took the costs on bord. 
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making process. Committees prefer to cooperate with the trade associations 
instead of individual professionals. An agreement might be achieved more easily 
with the trade associations than with the traders, at least in routine type 
situations. If emergency occurs, even the traders and the producers themselves 
are keen to cooperate and to find a joint solution. Another characteristic of the 
procedure is the exclusion of consumers and of any other person representing the 
public interest. Ad-hoc committees are seen as closed shops where the public is 
only approached once a technical solution to the emergency has been found 134 . 
The procedural rules in the management of the poisoned wine are different. They 
are dictated by the case in question. The marketing of poisoned wine constituted 
a criminal offence. Here a threshold seemed to be passed which excluded 
cooperation. The already mentioned case of the unsafe German noodles and 
unsafe English yogurts 135 makes clear that in emergency type situations even in 
the field of foodstuffs, cooperation has become the dominating principle if the 
action is not fraudulent as such. 
Negotiating a solution in a joint approach does not mean that the law and the 
powers foreseen in emergency type situations are useless. The Dutch experience 
in the management of office chairs clearly shows that competences are needed to 
push reluctant producers, dealers etc, into cooperation136. The law should even 
provide for a sophisticated set of legal instruments. lt enhances the position of 
the competent authorities. They use the legal instruments to threaten the parties 
concerned. Threat, however, requires that the instruments are available, a 
possible but not the only conclusion. Where there is a committee composed of 
the competent authorities, technical-scientific expertise, and trade associations as 
the main actors, their mutual connections might even bring to bear the 
application of means which are in fact not available or whose availability is not 
ensured. The Fachausschuß could initiate a recaII procedure which does not exist 
under German law, the HSE could threaten to close as unsafe any office which 
was supplied with new chairs of this make137. 
134 Even if access would be legally confirmed, one might wonder if such a rule would be enforced. lt 
might weil be that the management is dispersed from the official committee where access is 
guarantied to an new ad-hoc committee where they remain excluded. 
135 Cf. Ch. Willet, UK report, Part II, Chapter 10, 506 et seq. 
136 Cf. M.v.Gestel/G.M.F.Snijders, Dutch report, Part II, Chapter 7, 358 et seq. 
137 Cf. St.Weatherill, UK report, Part II, Chapter 10, 471 et seq. 
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3. The European experiences in the management of emergencies - the rapid 
exchange system and the hot-line 
The European Community has already gained some limited experience in the 
management of emergency situations. Then the question is, what, in the 
management is EC-specific, is pragmatic, rule-orientated or democratic, or is it 
all in once, undermining the maximisation principle? 
As far as consumer goods are concerned management remains at the lowest level 
one might dare to name management. So far the Commission refrains from 
processing the notification. The Commission applies literally the rules and 
procedures foreseen and regulated in the rapid exchange system 138. Management 
means channelling the incoming notification to the Member States whilst taking 
due care not to interfere in the responsibility of the Member States. The 
Commission works as a catalyst, a behaviour which is characteristic for 
international organisations. These provide the forum but do not intend and are 
not entitled to influence the process which takes place. 
Such a "management of information" is far from being useless. The case study 
on the poisoned wine allowed, quasi as a by-product, a deeper insight of the 
workability of the rapid exchange system. Although the risk was notified to the 
Commission at a relatively late date, the German authorities were already 
involved in the management of the emergency situation. lt seemed to be, 
however, as if the information provided help to the Netherlands. The Dutch 
Health Ministry got important information on testing procedures which was 
directly usable and used for action139. Portugal and Spain, too, undermined the 
important role of notifications channelled through the system140. This is partly 
due to the fact that their national infrastructures do not yet suffice to produce 
enough information on products which may be unsafe. The function is not to 
enhance transboundary information on unsafe products, but to substitute national 
deficiencies. 
Much more relevant is the experience of the Commission in the emergency 
management of foodstuffs. First of all, there are no rules which govern the 
notification, the processing and the decision-making at the Community level. 
The rapid exchange system was not made applicable to foodstuffs, though the 
Consumer Policy Service tried at a given time to extend the scope of application 
of the system to foodstuff. The main argument always brought forward against 
such thinking was the reference to the so-called red-telephone. Integrating the 
informal management into a regulatory system would deprive the red-telephone 
138 OJ L 70, 13.3.1984, 16 et seq. 
139 Cf. M. v.Gestel/G.M.Snijders, Dutch report, Part II, Chapter 7, 358 et seq. 
140 Cf. Calvao da Si!va, Portuguese report, Part II, Chapter 8, 385 et seq.; M.-A.L6pez-Sanchez, Spanish 
report, Part II, Chapter 10, 402 et seq. 
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of its main advantage: unbureaucratic and fast networking over the territories of 
the Member States centred in the hands of the Comrnission. If there are no rules, 
there is no space for rule-orientated management. One might call it pragmatic in 
a sense. The red-telephone, the hot-line, reflects the need for a European 
management of emergencies, which sets aside nearly all the formal barriers 
which have dorninated the discussion of the product safety directive for a long 
time: the type of measures which must and those which should be notified, the 
focus on mere information exchange under the auspices but without interference 
of the Comrnission, and last but not least the complicated and complex decision-
making process in the frame of the Cornitology141 . One cannot hide the fact, 
however, that the hot-line, is bound to personal links between the emergency 
managers all over the Community. If one looks for a characteristic of the 
European management, it would be the personal ties between the emergency 
managers, and the key role of the personal involvement of a lirnited number of 
persons all over the Community. 
The close contact is the result of the structural organisation of participation and 
integration in the three foodstuff committees 142. Neither of these comrnittees, 
whether consultative, expert or regulatory provide for the management of 
emergency situations. The Commission and the Member States are jointly 
operating in a forum, where the law and the legally established structures remain 
in the background, where the management takes place outside and beyond the 
law. One might turn the conclusion upside down and interpret the management 
of emergency situations in the area of foodstuff as an opportunity which is the 
direct result of a well established common agricultural policy for more than 
thirty years which has enabled the establishment of such networks on the basis of 
mutual trust. Consumer protection policy, i.e. the management of emergencies 
resulting from technical consumer goods, is far away from such a status in the 
Community, even after the adoption of the general product safety directive on 
the 29th June 1992. 
4. European prospects for action - harmonizing the ground for action 
Harmonization of product safety in the Community sets considerable incentives 
for the improvement of product safety legislation in the Community. Experience 
in the field of consumer credit and unfair advertising shows that Community 
legislation even at a rninimum level rnight lead to a revision of consumer product 
safety legislation even in those countries which are said to have a high level of 
141 OJ L 197, 18.7.1987, 33 et seq. 
142 There are three different types of committees, cf. H.-W. Micklitz, Organisational Structures, loc.cit. 
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protection. The introduction of a general safety requirement without reference to 
standards enhances a pragmatic safety-orientated approach rather than a rule-
guided thinking. But Community incentives are beyond the struggle of the role 
and function of technical standards, as they are important for countries where 
there is no comprehensive product safety regulation. Here the Community 
replaces national activities and facilitates the long-awaited improvement of 
consumer protection. 
The directive intervenes in the inner-organizational management of product 
safety as far as it requires Member States to establish one national body, not for 
the enforcement of product safety legislation, but as a contact point for the 
Commission in the exchange of information. This study underlines the key role 
of regional and local authorities in the management of emergency situations (and 
not in emergencies alone). Community law is addressed to the Member States, 
that means to the legislator, the administration and the courts. lt can not per se 
include regions or local authorities143. Europeanization of product safety 
strengthens the national level to the detriment of the regional and local levels144. 
Centralization seems to be inevitable to guarantee European management of 
emergency situations or - in broader terms - of product safety. The directive 
has missed the opportunity to strengthen even regional and local competence in 
the Member States145. The problem should not be set aside by referring to the 
structural deficiencies. There is a basic underlying conflict resulting from one-
sided market integrating instruments, which focus on states and set aside the 
inner-national administrative structure. The legal order of the Community is 
shaped according to the needs of a market146. The Single Act has introduced 
competences to achieve the Interna! Market but it has not revised the legal order. 
Product safety must be realized within or under the concept of the comrnon 
market, respectively the Interna! Market. The structural deficiencies become 
clear in the difficulties to integrate into a regulatory concept the regional and 
local enforcement authorities. 
The directive shapes the procedure and promotes the insertion of a set of 
regulatory instruments to enforce the product safety directive. The lesson told by 
the country reports is simple: procedural rules are needed but they should leave 
lee-way in their implementation. They must be applicable in the context of the 
various product safety situations. The same is more or less true for the set of 
143 Cf. St. Weatherill, Shaping Structures Part 1, Chapter 4, 199 et seq. 
144 Cf. the Independent, Monday 6th July J 992: "Thanks to my Super Hero Powers 1 can tel! you what to 
do, local govt!" 
145 The Federal Republic of Germany voted against the adoption of the directive, just to please the 
German Länder who fear a loss of competence. 
146 Cf. Ch.Joerges, Social Regulation and the Legal Structure of the EEC; and H.-W.Micklitz, 
Organisational Structures of Product Safety Regulations, both in: B.Stauder (ed.), loc.cit. 
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instruments. They are needed and they must be made available but their 
application should not restrict the autonomy of those who apply the law at the 
grass root-level. 
5. European prospects - the future management of emergency situations 
The directive provides for a distinction between the mere bureaucratic 
management along the line of the former rapid exchange system and the 
opportunity for the Commission to step into real management of emergencies in 
case of "exceptional circumstances". Both mechanisms remain formally within 
the borders the Comitologyl47 has set. Decision-making lies in the hands of the 
Council. 
Against the background of the findings one might raise the question whether the 
Community will not de facto receive the power of managing emergency 
situations. lt can by-pass easily the formal barriers erected by the Member States 
in binding the Commission's activities to the formal notification of the Member 
States and in refusing the Commission the competence to propose a regulatory 
measure to the emergency committee. Once the Comrnission is able to find a 
majority for what it believes to be necessary, it is even possible to make a 
majority decision immediately applicable148. Member States are then obliged to 
enforce the decision within ten days. Such a decision remains in force for three 
months only149. 
The directive follows the wide-spread regulatory philosophy in its attempt to 
define the notion of risk. Emergency type situations require a severe and direct 
danger to the health and safety of consumers. This seems to be in line with the 
legislation of the Member States. But the directive puts risk evaluation in 
"exceptional circumstances" in the hands of the Commission, that means a 
political bodyl50. The Member States could come into play only if the 
Comrnission so decides. The committee on emergency situations is composed of 
representatives of the Member States and the Commission. lt decides on the 
regulatory action proposed by at least one of the Member States151 . The directive 
does not explicitly envisage the possibility to integrate the technical-scientific 
expertise which is available at the Member States' level. That means that all the 
experience, the responsibility and the autonomy of the managers at the national 
level is set aside. Foodstuff regulation demonstrates the important role of 
147 OJL197,18.7.l987,33etseq. 
148 Cf. Art. 11 (1 ), loc.cit. 
149 Cf. Art. l l (2) and (3), loc.cit. 
150 Cf. for another reading ofthe directive, J.Falke, Part!, Chapter 5, 223 et seq. 
151 Cf. Art. 9 loc.cit. 
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committees at the community level, even if they have only a consultative status. 
What is needed then is to establish a consultative committee on product 
safety152. 
One might understand the directive, despite its flexibility in "exceptional 
circumstances" as a top down regulatory model, guided by the idea that the 
Member States notify measures they have already taken. Present management of 
emergency situations in the investigated Member States shows a bottom-up 
approach. Evaluation is a procedure in which the competent authorities, the 
technical-scientific expertise and the trade associations are integrated. The 
directive, as it stands, is hardly compatible with the findings of the study. The 
investigation procedure should be made mandatory and put into the hands of the 
Member States in order to guarantee that their technical-scientific expertise 
comes to bear. lt should be put in the hands of the Member State where the risk 
first arose. Some form of a home authority principle is needed as it can be found 
at least in an infant stage in the Council Regulation on the evaluation and control 
of the risks of existing substances153 where the assessment is put in the hands of 
the Member States in order to profit from their aggregated know-how, and in 
order to replace the technical and scientific expertise lacking at the Community 
level154. Such a European home authority principle could easily be linked to 
"trusteeship", to the obligation of each Member State to perform the 
investigation procedure in a European spirit, as a trustee of the Community legal 
order155. 
Putting the investigation in the hands of the Member States concerned would 
have the advantage that the assessment is made where the problem comes up and 
where the managers can bring to bear their specific capacities. This re-defined 
investigation procedure should be open to other Member States/third countries 
and to external expertise. In order to guarantee that the investigation procedure 
can not be instrumentalized by the respective Member State, that the Member 
State demonstrates responsibility and behaves as a trustee, mechanisms must be 
established to create counter-balancing competence in case of conflicts. That is 
to say, to provide for the possibility to integrate technical and scientific expertise 
from other Member States. Such a balanced committee can no longer be bound 
to the existence of a Member State's notification of an emergency. The 
Commission must be formally entitled to initiate the execution of the 
investigation procedure if it has become aware of an emergency situation. lt 
should be a point of consideration to grant European consumer organisations the 
right to address complaints to such a board and even to give them the right to ask 
152 Which is not yet even published as an official proposal of the Commission. 
153 Cf. OJ L 84, 5.4.1993, l et seq. 
154 Cf.H.-W. Micklitz, Organisational Structures, loc.cit. 
155 Cf. on the notion of "trustee", St. Weatherill, Part !, Chapter 4, 193 et seq. 
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for its establishment156. Last but not least, the decision on the risk evaluation at 
least in the field of foodstuffs, should be made public. Such a policy would be in 
line with the function entrusted to the European Environmental Protection 
Agency 157. The situation is different in the case of technical consumer goods. 
Here the question arises as to whether the emergency determination should be 
made public once it is done or whether it should be made public together with 
concrete proposals of what to do. 
What remains to be solved is the problem of the envisaged two-step 
procedure158: at the first step, a decision is taken on the existence of the risk, at 
the second the regulatory decision is prepared. This two-step procedure is the 
direct result of the restrictions resulting from the one sided market economy 
orientated constitution of the Community. Decision-making in the management 
committee may be down-graded to a decision on the Interna! Market and not to a 
decision on product safety. The Commission under the given structure is bound 
to leave emergency evaluation at the Member States' level - except in the case 
of exceptional circumstances - and to leave decision-making within the 
structures foreseen in the Treaty of Rome. Practice would require the 
establishment of a cooperative model to manage emergency situations, a model 
where the three main actors come together: the competent authorities, the 
technical-scientific expertise, the traders and their organisations. Only such a 
cooperative model could maintain the key elements of risk management: 
experience, autonomy and responsibility. 
There might be one exception where the two-step mechanism could lead to 
feasible results: this is in the case of criminal activities. Here the basis for 
cooperation is missing and the decisions might and should be taken at a 
ministerial level. But these cases do not constitute the core of emergency 
situations. What remains to be considered is the acceptance of the Spanish model 
as an intermediary solution: the setting up of an ad-hoc committee entrusted with 
regulatory powers and composed of the parties which are needed in a given case. 
The only question is who should decide on the establishment of the ad-hoc 
commission in a given case. If the decision is entrusted to the Council or the 
Commission under the management committee variant politicians would decide 
on the question of whether investigation of an emergency-type situation is 
needed or not. There seems to be no opportunity for the Commission to escape 
the organizational and structural border lines of the prevailing economic 
156 Like it exists already in the Common Commercial Policy, at least in the United States, cf. H.-W. 
Micklitz, Internationales Produktsicherheitsrecht, Zur Begründung einer Rechtsverfassung für den 
Handel mit risikobehafteten Produkten, Habilitationsschrift Bremen 1992. 
157 OJ L 120, 11.5.1990, 1 et seq. 
158 The two-step procedure is analysed in detail in H.-W.Micklitz, Organisational structures of product 
safety regulations, loc.cit. 
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constitution of the Community. The case of the management of emergency 
situation shows in a nutshell the dilemma of present Community social 
regulation. lt has to be achieved, because the Intemal Market cannot be realized 
without social regulation. But neither the Treaty of Rome nor the Single Act 
provide for the appropriate constitutional structure which allows an emergency 
evaluation and decision-making process beyond the borders of the Interna! 
Market philosophy. 
IV. The European Court of Justice- on the threshold to review the 
Community legal order ? 
J. H. H. Weiler159 has analysed the interrelationship between the divergencies of 
legal and political developments between the Court and the Commission on the 
one hand and the Member States as resembled in the Council of Ministers on the 
other. He stated in 1982 a growing interest of the Member States to influence the 
decision-making process in the Commission in order to counterbalance the 
Court's attempt to erect a supranational constitution160. The clou of his analysis 
lies in the conclusion: The double structure of supranationalism and 
intergovernmentalism stabilizes the integration process. The constant struggle 
between the different organs, in and around the shaping of a legal order bears a 
constructive pro-European element. Member States resistance and reluctance 
outweighs the predorninance of the Community legal order. The perspective here 
focuses on the pros and cons of a supranational community with an independent 
legal order. lt discusses the institutional challenge of the Community legal order 
which appeared after and alongside with the programme to complete the Interna! 
Market, but not at the inner administrative level within or outside the 
Comitology. Taking into consideration the institutional dimension of the EEC 
means foremost to analyse the so-called democratic deficit of the Community161 . 
The theory though it has proven to be very successful in explaining the process 
of integration in its ups and downs and the mutual dependence of the different 
political actors suffers from one major deficiency. lt suggests a coherent notion 
of Member States and of the Commission and does not really consider that 
neither the Member States nor the Commission are any longer homogeneous 
159 Cf. The Community Legal System. The Dual Character of Supranationalism, Yearbook of European 
Law, 1(1981),267 et seq. 
160 Cf. J.H.H. Weiler, Suprantional Law and Supranational Legal System: Legal Structures and Political 
Process in the European Community, PH.D. Thesis, European University Institute, 1982. 
161 This is even true for one of his last papers in which he summarizes the development of the 
Community Legal Order, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale Law Review, 1991, 2403 et seq. 
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bodies162. Below the level of decision making powers, structures have been built 
during the completion of the Interna! Market which have led to an interwoven 
network of experts and administrators operating largely outside legal and 
political control163. The twofold institutional deficiency at both scales of the 
balance requires further consideration and explanation and it prompts the 
Comitology in a key position. 
The Comitology must be understood as an attempt to exercise political 
accountability over the emergent administrative structures by way of formalizing 
and judicializing these very structures. The ongoing development of product 
safety regulation has demonstrated the need to further develop the structures and 
most of all to delegate emergency management to the Commission itself, which 
is much more than only one step further in the building of administrative 
structures. The Community would introduce a pass-mark and that is why the 
litigation between the FRG and the Council on Art. 9 of the directive is of such a 
striking importance. Delegating safety management powers 164 to the 
Commission would considerably enhance the establishment of even more 
flexible and even less legally and politically controllable europeanized intra-, 
and international forms of cooperation and joint action-taking. The sub-units of 
the Member States, mainly competent administrative bodies gain political 
autonomy against the formally responsible national (governmental) entity. 
Administrative management is no longer channelled through the formerly 
competent ministries of foreign and/or economic affairs, cooperation takes place 
at the level of competent ministries and even here it is no longer the political 
decision-making level, but the expert level, where the real process of 
Europeanization takes place. 
So what needs to be balanced out beyond and after 1992 is not alone the Member 
States political power as resembled in the Council against a strong European 
Court of Justice which benefits support from the Commission and the European 
Parliament in the shaping of a Community legal order. This task will sustain and 
even gain importance with the introduction of the subsidiarity principle in the 
Maastricht Treaty I 65. 
A new task, however, is in the offing and its renders balancing between 
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism even more complicated. lt consists 
of nothing less than re-constructing the Community legal order in the light of the 
162 Although he realizes that it is more and more difficult to speak of Member States, because the concept 
has so desperately lost clear cut demarcation lines. 
163 Cf. G. Majone, Cross Cultural Sources, loc. cit. 79 et seq. speaks of regulatory networks. 
164 lt is not the decision-making power alone which is the striking feature, cf. H.-W. Micklitz (ed.) Post 
Market Control of Consumer Goods, loc.cit. 
165 Cf. H.-W. Micklitz, The Maastricht Treaty, the Principle of Subsidiarity and the Theory of 
Integration, Lakimies 1993, 508 et seq. 
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emerging institutional patterns and social rights. The institutional patterns 
concern the reshaping of the notion of "state" in the Community legal order and 
the social rights, the position of the universal consumer, beyond and after market 
integration. One might feel tempted to attribute both issues to 
intergovernmentalism, to politics, to the Member States and release the Court 
from its role and function in the balancing process. That would theoretically be 
possible by driving back the process of integration, and by re-politicizing what 
has become part of the Community legal order, as "acquis communautaire". A 
first cornerstone will be the reach of the subsidiarity principle, does it justify 
Member States to refuse the transformation of a directive into national law 166. lt 
is not yet "exit" that would result from such a reading of the subsidiarity 
principle, but it would introduce beside "voice" a new category "halt" 167. 
Such an understanding of the emergent institutional patterns and the emergent 
social rights would, however, not fully catch the problem in which the 
integration process is stuck. There is an obvious gap between the real process of 
legal and political integration and the very same perception of that process in the 
Member States and the Community organs. Let us start with the 
intergovernmentalism side of the balance. Member States behave as if the inner-
administrative penetration, horizontally between the different national authorities 
and vertically with the competent sub-units of the Commission, does not exist. 
The Community legal order, at the other side of the balance seems to be much 
more advanced and developed than even the Community organs would admit. lt 
is true the Court seems to be ill-equipped to meet the new challenge. There are 
no or extremely limited notions in the Treaty of how the inner institutional 
patterns should look168 and there are no rights mentioned in the Treaty granted to 
consumers. The Court, however, has gone far in developing out of the four 
freedoms and the competence rules social rights169 and it will have to decide 
under the heading of competences on the future shaping of emergency 
management which bear a structural element of the new Community legal order 
in it 170. Just like in the area of the four freedoms, the Court gets involved more 
and more in the inner-organisation of the Member States, a competence, which is 
formally left in their hands, just like Art. 36 justifies formally the Member States 
166 In Spring 1994, the German Cabinet has decided to postpone the implementation of the product safety 
directive by reference to the subsidiarity principle. 
167 Cf. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyality - Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States, 
1970, and J.H.H. Weiler, Tue Transformation of Europe, who uses Hirschman's categories as a cluster 
for the analysis of the European integration process. 
168 Cf. Art. 155 and the Comitolgy, M. Bach, Eine leise Revolution durch Verwaltungsverfahren -
Bürokratische Integrationsprozesse in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Zeitschrift für Soziologie 21 
(1992), 16 et seq. 
169 Cf. beyond what has been elaborated supra, E. Steindorff, Quo vadis Europa?, loc.cit. 
170 Cf. Case C-359/92, OJ 1992 C 288/10. 
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to uphold their powers in social regulation. The Court is constantly repeating the 
basic principles of Community law, the Member States' autonomy to decide on 
social rights and to shape their own institutional structures, by so doing, 
however, it is undermining the principles it advocates for and it is constantly 
doing what it would publicly reject: to create social rights and to establish 
institutional patterns. 
The point here is not so much to define the psycho-sociological constraints of 
that behaviour and the inner complexities of the European organs, and it is not 
even or not even alone, whether the Court has jurisdiction to decide on the 
institutional patterns and on the existences of consumer rights. lt is much more 
whether the Court should go on further that way or whether it endangers by a 
new set of landmark decisions the balance between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism and provokes a severe draw-back of the Member States at the 
political side and of the Member States Supreme Courts' at the legal side 171 . lt 
has to be recalled that the German Constitutional Court has decided on the 
constitutionality of the Maastricht Treaty with the German Basic Law172. Legal 
doctrine in the FRG shows a certain tendency to mobilize the Constitutional 
Court against the European Court of Justice, a strange alliance of those who 
want to bring the integration process to a halt and those who want to 
instrumentalize the national courts for initiating a democratization process after 
Maastricht. There is no clear answer. The further building of the Community 
legal order does not necessarily require landmark decisions, at least not as long 
as the national supreme courts are willing to follow suit173. The building of 
institutional patterns and the elaboration of social rights seems to be better 
described as a silent process which Ieads to an absorption of Member States 
powers on the one band and to the building of a quasi-European state on the 
other. 
171 Cf. J.H.Weiler, Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the European 
Court of Justice in the Arena of PoJitical Integration, Journal of Common Market Studies, (31 ), l 993, 
417etseq. 
l 72 Cf. Chapter 1, Federalism and Responsibility, 23 et seq. 
173 What cannot be taken for granted, cf. the conflict on the notion of misleading advertising between the 
BGH and the ECJ, E. Steindorff, Unlauterer Wettbewerb im System des EG-Rechts, WRP 1993, 139 
et seq. 
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